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DERYA ÇINAR 
Danışman: Dr. Süha Oğuzertem 
2014, 78 Sayfa 
Jüri: 
Prof. Dr. Jale Parla 
Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayten Zara 
Bu çalışma, edebi, felsefi, sosyo-politik, kültürel ve bilimsel laboratuvarlardan 
insana dair varlıkbilimsel bir incelemeyi, 21. yüzyılda yaygınlaşmakta olan fantastik bir 
unsur olarak kurgulanan zombi motifinin güncel popülerliğini, insanın benlik ve kimlik 
teşhisi sorgulamalarının temelinde yatan temsil ihtiyacından aldığına dair bir zombi 
teorisini tartışmaktadır.  
Bu çalışmanın ilk bölümü, zombi kavramının kökenlerini, bu olguya zemin 
hazırlayan coğrafi, kültürel, politik ve tarihsel platformlardan yola çıkarak açıklamayı 
amaçlar. Bu bağlamda, ne kadar insanız, ölmek ve yaşamak birer hak mıdır, olmak mı, 
ölmek mi gibi sorular, 18. yüzyıldan günümüze görsel ve yazılı eserler üzerinden 
incelenir.  
Tezin ikinci bölümü, insanın hem kendi yadsıması hem de kendi kimliklendirmesi 
gerçeği dolayısıyla zombinin varlığını, ölüm ve yaşam arasındaki kısır döngünün 
getirdiği hissiyatsızlık, yabancılaşma, zamansızlık, devamlılığın sekteye uğraması, dil-
ses-bilinç ve sonuç olarak benlik kaybı ve ötekileşme üzerinden tartışır. İnsanlığın 
masumiyetini yitirmesi ve yaşanan dünyada varolmanın doğal haline yabancılaşması 
hikâyeleri insanlığın muhtemel sonuna dair bir soruyu gündeme getirmiş ve varolmanın 
dehşeti sonsuz boyutlar kazanarak bir zombi teorisinin oluşabilmesine zemin 
hazırlamıştır. Felsefi ve edebi eserler ışığında, insanlığın görmezden geldiği kabul 
edilemez gerçekliklerin zombi kavramında beden bulup bulmadığı bu çalışma 
kapsamında sorgulanmıştır. 
 
Anahtar sözcükler: zombi, kendilik, öteki, hiçlik, insan-sonrasılık. 
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 ABSTRACT 
MASTER THESIS 
TOWARDS A ZOMBIE THEORY FROM SIX FEET ABOVE 
DERYA ÇINAR 
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Süha Oğuzertem 
2014, 78 p. 
Jury Members: 
Prof. Dr. Jale Parla 
Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayten Zara 
This study aims at viewing a zombie theory based on a need for representation 
underlying the questions of self and identity of the human through the laboratories of 
literature, philosophy, socio politics, culture, and science and includes the current 
popularity of the motif of the zombie fictionalized as an element of fantasy pervading in 
the twenty-first century. 
The first part of the study aims at clarifying the origins of the concept of zombie 
through the geographical, cultural, political and historical platforms paving the way for 
this phenomenon. At this stage, questions such as how much human we are, whether 
dying and living are natural rights and whether to live or to die is a better choice have 
been maintained in terms of visual and written works since the eighteenth century. 
The second part of this study discusses the presence of zombie through human's 
reality of self-negation and self-identification via indifference, alienation, timelessness, 
the ruptured continuity, the loss of sound, language and consciousness, and ultimately 
the loss of self and the other. The fable of humanity's loss of innocence and alienation 
from a natural way of being in the world brings about a question for a probable 
endgame of humanity and the dread of being transforms into infinite dimensions where 
a zombie theory in the making could stem from. In the light of literary and 
philosophical works, whether the pretension of humanity against its own unacceptable 
realities is incarnated in the concept of zombie has been questioned within the body of 
this study. 
Keywords: the zombie, self, the other, nothingness, post-humanism.  
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 During my studies at İstanbul Bilgi University, Dr. Süha Oğuzertem, by courtesy 
of whom, the intellectual aura has been able to take its form encompassing my academic 
curiosities. His excellence as a mentor and a scholar has always been incomparable 
since rarely could a university lecturer be credited for being both precise and 
compassionate. His incessant encouragement and meticulous monitoring have rendered 
this Master thesis possible. Prof. Dr. Jale Parla is the very lecturer whose seminars have 
gone beyond lectures and it is her professorship which has led me into the world of 
literature. I believe the word “metamorphosis” wouldn’t be better delivered and felt but 
for her. She is the angel on the shoulder of literature. Assistant Professor Selen Vanessa 
Ansen is the living proof how incessant flows of sophisticated philosophical thoughts 
could turn into a fine music in classroom situations. Her very kind and pleasant manners 
and her very clever presentations have helped me perceive many challenging theories.  
 Finally, Göktuğ Çınar, who is my muse and my better half, has always been the 
strength and courage I need. Without him, none would be possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ÖZET . . . . . . . . . . i 
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . iii 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . 1 
PART I: AN AUTOMATON BIOGRAPHY  . . . . 7 
A.  From Cradle to the Grave . . . . . . 12  
B. Beyond the Grave . . . . . . . 27  
PART II: A SELF-AUTOPSY . . . . . . 40 
A. Humanimalism . . . . . . . 40 
B. Exodus  . . . . . . . . 63 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . 73  
WORKS CITED . . . . . . . . 76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The presence of the zombie, a concept depicted and examined primarily in 
literary, cultural and scientific pulpits, arises curiosity with regards to the existence and 
frequency of its popularity whilst its current reputation prevails and further covers 
premises of computer games, comic books, films, fashion and music. To give an 
example, The Walking Dead, which is an award-wining American post-apocalyptic 
horror drama television series, has recorded viewership of 16.1 million since its 
premiere in 2010. Whether this fascination of the viewers with the "walkers" in the 
series lies in their need for identification with these flesh-eating creatures is worth 
questioning. This is what inaugurates a scholarly investigation of the figure of living 
dead within this thesis, the scope of which aims at questioning a probable zombie theory 
based on the issue of identification with its emphasis on the self and the other in literary 
and cultural trajectories via lenses of life-death, individual-society, time-space, and 
essentially through being-nothingness. 
 Given the notion of zombie evolution or the concept of human metamorphosis 
together with human civilization, questions may arise as to whether the zombie 
resembles our prehistoric past, acts as a mirror reflecting our present anxieties, or 
suggests if the future will house a more evolved post-humanity or merely the graves of a 
failed civilization. In the case of the zombie, their metaphysical world totally rejects the 
boundary between life and death. A puppet possessed of life would evoke such horror 
since it would negate all conceptions of a natural physicalism and affirm metaphysics of 
nightmare and chaos. Without narrowing the scope of the status of zombie down to its 
popularity in films, it is worth considering that this concept, which exists in various 
audio, visual and written works, has not evolved within texts; on the contrary, it appears 
to be a metamorphosis giving shape to the texts. What is more, should the concept of 
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zombie be regarded as laying emphasis on post-humanism, then the concept of “infinite 
othering” constituting a basis for self identification will need to be underlined. As for 
the recent popularity of the zombie, it has been used in various discourses primarily in 
novels, and as a consequence of the estranged society at odds with itself, in performance 
arts and demonstrations by means of which the audience can be both the character and 
even the writer of his own zombie story. 
 Should alteration under control be ascribed to metamorphosis, does zombie, 
being a fantastic concept, emerge merely as a mobile corpse returned from the dead, or 
is it rather a representative of a vicious cycle or even a failure in metamorphosis itself? 
Is death as natural as life itself? Can everybody exercise the right of mortality? If 
answers to these questions and similar inquiries are sought through the lenses of being 
and nothingness, they might be found in the simultaneous and controversial state of the 
self having both the subject and object qualities in Jean-Paul Sartre’s work Being and 
Nothingness.  
 Another irony of the presence of the zombie today is the fact that this creature 
which is representative of the loss of self merely craves for human flesh which 
ultimately transforms into nothing but once again the zombie itself.  Therefore, the 
concepts of lack of communication, language, memory and silence on the grounds of 
the arguments of loss of self and identity will be worth examining with respect to 
individual and society. The historical repertoire of memory erosion and the concept of 
otherization within societies besides the metamorphoses observed in those individuals 
and societies subsequent to wars or certain social post-traumatic states might have led 
the human to write his autobiography. At this point, Deborah Christie and Sarah Juliet 
Lauro’s Better off Dead: The Evolution of the Zombie As Post-Human, and Sarah 
Wasson and Emily Alder's Gothic Science Fiction 1980-2010 will serve as the 
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backbones of this thesis as two significant sources. The zombie, neither being able to 
give up on the past nor willing to become a part of the future reserves the components 
of both gothic and science-fiction genres. We may then question by virtue of the human 
experiment conducted in the metamorphosis machine within Gothic science fiction 
whether the zombie advocates the phenomenon “to die or not being able to die at all” 
rather than the one “to be or not to be.” 
 The zombie is an everlasting beginning. His migration through these pages will 
follow a historical map, yet zombie itself doesn’t need a map of his own; it challenges 
the linear patterns of history and instead orbits in a circular pattern around the human 
planet. The uncanniness is what gives the zombie its mere peculiarity. The term is used 
under the category of the genre of “supernatural horror” in which there is a reference to 
nonhuman forms that disport human qualities. As for the zombie, who is the undead and 
the monster of paradox, things are neither one thing or another; in their uncanny and 
supernatural aspects, the underlying phenomenon for the study of a zombie theory is 
based on the fact that things that are discovered can be two things at once, which is 
rather horrifying for human beings, of course, since humans live in a physical world 
which is controlled by the seemingly steadfast rules of either being alive or dead.  
 Then, when do we perceive the presence of the zombie? Naturally, when we 
choose to do so. Moreover, what we see in a portrayal of the zombie could still be 
beguiling since the human, in his self-deception, keeps his secret well hidden in his 
mind for fear that he betray to himself a secret too terrible to accept.  
In his book entitled The Conspiracy against the Human Race, Thomas Ligotti 
unravels this self-mask: 
All supernatural horror obtains in what we believe should be and 
should not be. As scientists, philosophers, and spiritual figures have 
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testified, our heads are full of illusions; things, including human things, 
are not dependably what they seem. Yet one thing we know for sure: the 
difference between what is natural and what is not. Another thing we 
know is that nature makes no blunders so untoward as to allow things, 
including human things, to swerve into supernaturalism. Were it to make 
such a blunder, we would do everything in our power to bury this 
knowledge. But we need not resort to such measures, being as natural as 
we are. No one can prove that our life in this world is a supernatural 
horror, nor cause us to suspect that it might be. Anybody can tell you 
that––not least a contriver of books that premise the supernatural, the 
uncanny, and the frightfully paradoxical as essential to our nature. (18) 
Let us then examine the diverse approaches to conceptual phenomena that seem 
to illustrate philosophical views: the hidden secret of humanity could easily be in 
disguise of the zombie phenomenon, which we look forward to meeting with an 
unawareness that there’s an I within us, deep, deeper than ourselves. What was once the 
home of all things tends to be alienated due to its uncanny quality, which is defined to 
be “unheimlich” by Sigmund Freud in his essay entitled “The Uncanny”:   
I will relate an instance taken from psychoanalytical experience; 
if it does not rest upon mere coincidence, it furnishes a beautiful 
confirmation of our theory of the uncanny. It often happens that male 
patients declare that they feel there is something uncanny about the 
female genital organs. This unheimlich place, however, is the entrance to 
the former heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where everyone 
dwelt once upon a time and in the beginning. There is a humorous 
saying: ‘Love is home-sickness’; and whenever a man dreams of a place 
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or a country and says to himself, still in the dream, ‘this place is familiar 
to me, I have seen there before’, we may interpret the place as being his 
mother’s genitals or her body. In this case, too, the unheimlich is what 
heimlich, homelike, familiar was once; the prefix ‘un’ is the token of 
repression. (15) 
This thesis consists of two parts, the first of which is entitled “An Automaton 
Biography” and is further broken down into two subsections: “From Cradle to the 
Grave” and “Beyond the Grave” respectively. The first part focuses on the variations of 
the definitions of the zombie, its categories and recent reflections through a historical 
understanding. The extraordinary metamorphosis of the human in gothic science fiction 
through the eighteenth to the twenty-first centuries will be discussed by means of points 
of transition as manifested in these centuries. While the zombie is depicted as a cultural, 
political and religious product and a phenomenon, definitions of which depending on 
the onlooker in the scope of socio-history, this presence with seemingly supernatural 
powers had tribal origins. In fact, it starts its journey as an African-originated spirit and 
then appears to be the representative of dead bodies reanimated as a consequence of 
sacred rituals within Haitian culture, and lastly turns into the aggressive, flesh-eating 
fictionalized creature of today as a threat against the individual’s existential 
predicament. The evolution of the zombie mythology in the western thought has been 
analyzed around metaphysical, epistemological and ontological studies since the 
eighteenth century. As result of this, the increasing appeal of the concept of zombie in 
the twenty-first century may convey a feature of this mythology which triggers the 
existential worry of humanity with regards to its own mortality or rather its transient 
state. 
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The second part of the thesis is entitled “A Self-Autopsy” and it is divided into 
two subsections as “Humanimalism” and “Exodus” successively, which attempt to 
monitor the zombie theory itself via cultural, political, psychoanalytic, and psycho-
philosophical lenses. In these sections, the existential nature of the zombie and the 
relationship between the self and the myth are examined. The psychological duality 
between what is “I” and “Not I” which is apparent in self identification and negation, 
underlies the zombie theory and it is in fact woven within the infinite depths of the 
individual. The objectivity of the zombie is the innate material where the 
metamorphosis of human to post-human and ultimately to non-human takes place; 
therefore, a body, the foundations of which lay in such an abyss, is not considered to be 
the homeland of life. The zombie theory in this study argues that the most basic human 
instinct is not rooted in life or death but rather in the seductive fear of purgatory.  
 Controversial as they might be, the following arguments will pursue varied 
research questions and hopefully they will be for the most part complementary rather 
than incompatible with a focus on the phenomenon of zombie as the object of 
comparison.  
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 PART ONE.  
AN AUTOMATON BIOGRAPHY 
 Fictions of bodily transformation might serve as new technologies of writing; 
their corporeal formations comprise a cultural history of narrative transformations. As 
we may notice these metamorphoses when Daphne turns into a laurel tree or Narcissus 
into a flower, the biographies of these narratives represent the formation or reformation 
of self-reflection of humans. Hardly has there been a time in history where the lived 
lives of people have to confront a critical question for what marks the human species. 
One might like to follow the roads and stations in order to analyze these biographies of 
human experience; however, it might be the accidents in between those stations which 
may mark the biographies of the silent. Therefore, what the zombie fetches from the 
afterlife is constitutive of a unique experience beyond the limits of human perception 
which the library of Babel wouldn’t overlook. While tracing the chain of this utterly 
unfamiliar notion, it will be noticed that various definitions have been proposed with the 
hope that this conception running directly counter to the orthodox doctrines may assert a 
pure experience for those six feet above.  
 Contemporary fiction portrays the perils of human status in disguise of demonic 
creatures like those of pre-modern folks and legends, and human constructions 
transform into non-human agencies through spiritual metaphors. The modern depictions 
of bodily metamorphoses focus on organizations of biological elements with no turning 
back. They are uncanny syntheses which tend to refuse renaturalization. Kafka’s 
“Metamorphosis” stands for this type of metamorphosis. Yet, we will see whether this is 
the case with the post-human metamorphosis in the portrayal of the zombie. How the 
surreal phenomenon of this creature turns into an almost indistinguishable reality will 
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be what is portrayed and autopsied in the laboratories primarily of literature, audio-
visual arts, computer games, discourse analysis, philosophy, popular culture and 
science. This candidate to be the representative of post-human condition will try to pass 
through the hallway of literature in this text bearing in mind the uncanny question or the 
expectation as to whether it is to stay or to leave is a better choice. The influence of the 
zombie fiction in the fields of cultural studies, literature, and philosophy has apparently 
been immense, as it has pervaded all modern questions concerning being and 
nothingness. Furthermore, we may look at the immortal and timeless qualities of this 
entity with a view to a change from the finite to the infinite. The accidents, or rather the 
errors, along the way, may reveal the truth behind the undying quality of this entity. In 
his book entitled The Book to Come, Maurice Blanchot explains the meaning of 
becoming through literary infinity by stating that “the truth of literature might be in the 
error of the infinite” (93). Furthermore, Maurice Blanchot mentions the error in this 
infinite journey: 
 The error, the fact of being on the go without ever being able to 
stop, changes the finite into infinity. And to it these singular 
characteristics are added: from the finite, which is still closed, one can 
always hope to escape, while the infinite vastness is a prison, being 
without an exit––just as any place absolutely without exit becomes 
infinite. The place of wandering knows no straight line; one never goes 
from one point to another in it; one does not leave here to go there; there 
is no point of departure and no beginning to the walk. Before having 
begun, already one begins again; before having finished, one broods, and 
this short of absurdity (consisting of returning without ever having left, 
or of beginning by beginning again) is the secret of the "evil" eternity, 
8 
 
corresonding to "evil" infinity, both of which perhaps contain the 
meaning of becoming. (94) 
 We may, therefore, approach the zombie concept as the fictional image of the 
evil infinity as a result of the human error. In his article entitled “Zombie Death Drive: 
Between Gothic and Science Fiction,” Fred Botting clarifies the definition of zombie: 
 Zombies are the real lower-class citizens of the monster world. A 
lesser type of the undead and very much in the shadow – the very poor 
relations – of their charming bloodsucking aristocratic cousins, zombies 
have none of the style, attractiveness or supernatural power of vampires. 
Nor do they, unlike Frankenstein’s monstrous progeny with its curious if 
lumbering dignity of labour, retain much trace of humanity. On screen, 
zombies tend not to evoke sympathy or identification: it is difficult to 
remain unrepulsed by a humanoid creature with half a face slavering over 
the intestines of a dismembered teenager or enjoy the suffering of a 
ravenous mass of bloody hands clutching hungrily and with grim 
inevitability at any living flesh. Physically unprepossessing, intellectually 
challenged and lacking any social skills or redeeming qualities –
thoroughly unromanticizable – the zombies remain at the trashiest end of 
a trashy genre. (36) 
It will be beneficial to prepare and introduce the framework before taking a 
probable photo of the zombie. The genre called to be gothic or fantasy literature was 
rooted in the eighteenth century with The Castle of Otranto (1765) by Horace Walpole 
and thanks to the pens of various writers including primarily Stevenson, Stoker, and 
Wells during the nineteenth century, the genre contributed to the evolution of the horror, 
science-fiction, fantasy and gothic works of the twenty first century. In order to have a 
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better understanding of the framework of the zombie theory, we may focus on the 
“gothic science fiction” as a critical theory trusted to the readers of the twenty-first 
century and it aims at disclosing “something buried, something hidden [...] by its 
enduring heft, richness and depth within its creative mode” (Roberts 11). A zombie 
theory which will be attempted to be unearthed from this depth, therefore, will be on 
one hand “uncanny [being] that class of the terrifying which leads back to something 
long known to us, once very familiar” (1) in Sigmund Freud’s words. On the other 
hand, it will be “fantastic as a result of a shared uncertainty between the reader and the 
persona of the story who has to decide as to whether the concept perceived is a reality as 
defined by the thought shared” (Todorov 47). In his essay entitled “The Uncanny,” 
Sigmund Freud further explains the underlying basis for the concept of the uncanny: 
Catalepsy and the re-animation of the dead have been represented 
as most uncanny themes. But things of this sort again are very common 
in fairy-stories. Who would be so bold as to call it an uncanny moment, 
for instance, when Snow-White opens her eyes once more? And the 
resuscitation of the dead in miracles, as in the New Testament, elicits 
feelings quite unrelated to the uncanny. Then the theme that achieves 
such an indubitably uncanny effect, the involuntary recurrence of the 
like, serves, too, other and quite different purposes in another class of 
cases. One case we have already heard about in which it is employed to 
call forth a feeling of the comic; and we could multiply instances of this 
kind. Or again, it works as a means of emphasis, and so on. Another 
consideration is this: whence come the uncanny influences of silence, 
darkness and solitude? Do not these factors point to the part played by 
danger in the aetiology of what is uncanny, notwithstanding that they are 
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also the most frequent accompaniment of the expression of fear in 
infancy? And are we in truth justified in entirely ignoring intellectual 
uncertainty as a factor, seeing that we have admitted its importance in 
relation to death? (16) 
 In addition to the uncanny quality zombie evokes, Gothic science fiction already 
promises an uncertainty with respect to both integration and a separation. It is curious 
that the words “gothic” and “science” complement with the word “fiction” constituting 
a meaningful sense. According to Darko Suvin, science fiction is a genre “in which the 
reader enters an imaginative world different or estranged from his or her empirical 
world, but different in a way that obeys rational causation or scientific law: thus, it is 
estranged cognitively” (Qtd. in Luckhurst 21). The genres of the Gothic, along with 
horror fiction, fantasy or fairy tales, might well offer estranged worlds, but they are far 
from cognitive: “these are not scientific but magical genres, where the causations are 
folkloric, irrational or arbitrary” (Qtd. in Luckhurst 21). Then, the Gothic has the 
present irrationally dominated by the resurgence of the past, which is apprehended only 
by overwhelming and disabling affect, typically of paralyzing horror. Therefore, a depth 
created by the contemporary clues where one could dig out the past and future is buried 
within seems proper enough for the development of zombie. Hence, the use of socio-
historical and psycho-philosophical lenses in a metamorphosis microscope is inevitable 
in order to define this creature. The zombie faces with the causality of its well-rounded 
popularity in the light of the philosophical arguments regarding memory and 
consciousness as it is being pulled out of the depth within our minds. “Therefore, it is 
even more surprising that novelists who are concerned with a flawless representation of 
life the most place this fabricated and insubstantial creature in the center of their works” 
(Cohn 16). So much so that, definitions acquired may even come out against our 
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expectations just like this grunting, eye-sore, flesh eating monster itself. Yet again, 
“what virtue remains in the act of unmasking when we know full well what lies beneath 
the mask?” (Felski 1).   
 A. From Cradle to the Grave  
 The ubiquity of zombie in popular culture will by no doubt serve as an element 
of surprise insomuch as it is even more popular now than ever before which gives the 
rightful place for further investigation into the evolution of this fearsome figure of 
“living death”. Without doubt, the theory herein deserves to catch some glimpses of the 
zeitgeist in which one may witness how this theory might have developed along with 
human civilization. From works like 28 Days Later to World War Z, the need to define 
exactly what we mean when we call something a zombie requires to map out the ways 
how this monster has been and will continue to be a useful theoretical apparatus. Maybe 
even before an attempt of such an inspection, one should knock on wood right on the 
coffin itself. Will it sound “trick or treat?” 
 To be able to interpret the zombie grunting, one needs a keen ear and an 
understanding of how the early zombie morphed from exotic to evil. This creature 
having the innocence of neither of a sleepwalker nor a mummy is undoubtedly supposed 
to have its own history book somewhere buried even deeper. The archeology of such a 
book may lead one back to the lands of Africa. The zombie mythology possesses a rich 
history and a much broader relevance to contemporary cultures. This sociohistorical 
evolution of the myth through and across cultural landscapes is indicative of the rite of 
passage of this moving corpse. The first appearance of this monster emerges from 
religious and cultural origins of the African diaspora. Only then will the journey go 
through the fields of Haitian sugarcane into the land of milk and honey. In his article 
entitled “And the Dead Shall Rise,” Kevin Boon focuses on the ways how this monster 
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has been characterized depending on the discrepancies concerning landscapes and time 
zones: 
 The zombie is primarily a political, cultural, and religious 
product, and how it is defined depends on who is looking; thus western 
and Haitian characterizations of the zombie differ. Further, contemporary 
characterizations (American and Haitian) largely differ from early 
nineteenth-century characterizations, so much so that no single 
perspective can contain the whole myth. Parts of the myth may, at times, 
even contradict one another. Just as voodoo and tales of zombies were 
employed by colonial forces to dehumanize Haitians, they are also a 
source of empowerment for Haiti and its citizens, a valorizing sign of 
Haitianness. (6)  
 When we look at the contemporary American zombies, one could take three 
remarkable similarities into consideration: they are born of infection, are the dead 
returned to life, and have a taste for human flesh. Nevertheless, this has not always been 
the case with the image of the popular zombie. The earliest zombies introduced into 
U.S. culture were neither sick nor cannibalistic. They were instead puppets of an exotic 
religion at their puppeteer’s disposal. It is commonly acknowledged that modern 
zombies were born in George Romero’s 1968 film Night of the Living Dead. However, 
the bonds that relate modern zombies to their Haitian ancestors are sometimes 
overlooked. These cannibalistic roots are what give the zombie its lasting popularity 
particularly as it is one of the few Hollywood monsters that come from outside Europe. 
As a matter of fact, stories around Haitian voodoo are fear factor regarding an 
independent black republic for the American psyche in the twentieth century.  
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 Chera Kee witnesses this continental shift in her article entitled “They Are Not 
Men…They Are Dead Bodies!: From Cannibal to Zombie Back Again”: 
 From the time of the Haitian Revolution onward, stories of 
voodoo circulated throughout the Americas and Europe. Anxiety about 
Haiti in the United States translated into an anxiety about voodoo, which 
was increasingly linked to cannibalism in the U.S. popular press to 
underscore supposed Haitian primitivism. Yet, after the tumultuous U.S. 
occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934, cannibalism began to fade out of 
the discourse surrounding voodoo in favor of zombies. (9) 
 No sooner had this cannibalistic discourse with regards to Haitian voodoo 
prevailed through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than a transformation into a 
racialized discourse inevitably showed itself in the early zombie films. However, this 
matter of racial segregation evidently led to the dissolution of the overt link to Haiti and 
voodoo and ended up representing any ethnic group as zombie. Zombie fiction came to 
represent a more diffuse definition of the self and the other as it evolved into its modern 
form. As a result of this, the fine line between “us” and “them” grow thinner in 
“Hollywood’s zombie films from the late 1930s to 1968, when Night of the Living Dead 
enacted its radical break in the genre” (Kee 10). In order to have full grasp of zombie 
archeology, therefore, one must have the necessary tools for excavation and need to 
know the exact site for such an exploration which is nowhere but Haiti itself.  
 The way leading to the evolutionary embodiment of the zombie stems from the 
idea of revolutionary heroes; moreover, this irony is somehow justified due to the fear 
of a massacre of the whites remaining in Haiti. The history of the realm following a 
series of slave revolts in the 1970s took a turn into becoming the first black-ruled 
independent nation in the western hemisphere in 1804. As part of their cultural heritage, 
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voodoo gatherings were integral to the beginnings of the revolts which provided the 
future leaders of the revolution yet “the connection between the revolution and voodoo 
presented opponents of Haitian independence with a means to disparage revolutionary 
ideas by linking them to a supposedly barbaric, superstitious belief system” (Kee 10). 
The heroes of the Haitian revolution were also heroes to slaves throughout the Americas 
and slaveholders naturally feared similar revolts and mistrusted slave gatherings, 
particularly those with regards to voodoo. This fine line between the colors of black and 
white had become so distinct that any stories concerning black revolution were held 
responsible as threats against the presence of white people. To put it in a nutshell, 
“Haitian Revolution reinforced the conviction that slave emancipation in any form 
would lead to economic ruin and to the indiscriminant massacre of white populations” 
(Kee 10). Nevertheless, the hemisphere’s only black-ruled republic couldn’t help raising 
much curiosity since the island existed in virtual isolation. Thus, what little information 
found about Haiti wasn’t subject to much critical interrogation. Much of the material 
available in English regarding nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was written 
either by those who were alienated to nation’s identity or by those who were in pursuit 
of benefiting from Haiti for their own ideological interests. Therefore, Haiti happened to 
be a battleground between abolitionists and slavers, used by both to prove their 
respective points. Chera Kee issues this ideological conflict in her article entitled “From 
Cannibal to Zombie and Back Again”: 
 In Sketches of Hayti: From the Expulsions of the French to the 
Death of Christophe (1872), W.W. Harvey, in many ways an admirer of 
Haiti, nevertheless remarks that the country’s history since the revolution 
presents to us the picture of a people newly escaped from slavery, yet 
still suffering and exhibiting in their character, its pernicious and 
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demoralizing effects. Harvey’s views were typical of the abolitionists and 
missionaries writing on Haiti during the early nineteenth century. Yet 
those opposed to abolition were much more critical. In an 1805 letter 
from French Foreign Minister Charles Talleyrand to U.S. Secretary of 
State James Madison, for instance, Talleyrand observes, the existence of 
a Negro people in arms, occupying a country it has soiled by the most 
criminal acts, is a horrible spectacle for all white nations. There are no 
reasons to grant support to these brigands who have declared themselves 
the enemies of all government. (Kee 11) 
 Such ideological and political clashes are indicative of the quality that Haiti’s 
revolution deprived white Europeans and Americans of the ability to “civilize” the 
black world; therefore, Haiti had to be demonized so as to create a situation where the 
civilizing forces of the white world could save the nation from itself. As a result, the 
revolution and the nation it produced could by no means be regarded to be a success; it 
could be nothing but a corrupted mindless corpse itself. 
 In such colonialist manifesto, Haiti was portrayed as a country in ruin. This 
waste land was regarded to be the cause for the devolution which was nothing but a 
malicious black magic. To give an example, a 1920 article on Haiti in National 
Geographic depicted them to be ”natives forgetting their thin veneer of Christian 
civilization and reverted to utter, unthinking animalism, swayed only by fear of local 
bandit chiefs and the black magic of voodoo witch doctors” (Kee 12). 
 Indeed, much of the texts in the nineteenth century concerning Haiti arouse 
interest among the readers of the time insomuch as they were associated with 
cannibalism. Despite the popularity of such text on Haiti, it was not clear whether they 
were mere gossips or rumors. Fictitious as most of these reports might be, they tended 
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to be repeated nonetheless. To give an example, Spencer St. John “devoted a great deal 
of his 1884 book Hayti, or the Black Republic of Voodoo [...]  and tied it to cannibalism, 
human sacrifice, and grave robbing although he never actually attended a voodoo 
ceremony” (Kee 12). Yet, he was careful to assert that cannibalism was not performed 
under the rule of French since it would have been difficult to realize “when colonial 
masters kept such a close eye on their property” (Kee 12). Naturally, what was inherent 
in St. John’s assertion was the fact that cannibalism could have endured as a result of 
Haitian self-rule. Following his claims, writings on Haitian voodoo continued on the 
allegation that Haitians ate their children in sacrifice to voodoo gods. Such pretension of 
devouring the offspring and the terror attempted to inflict alongside with it can also be 
traced back to Greek mythology regarding the myth of foundation of earth. It is worth 
questioning whether the myth is indicative of the fear of a supreme god, or a riot against 
the authority of the other or even a necessary clause in the matters of life and death in 
which one needs to die in order for the other to survive. In her book entitled Ebedi 
Kutsal Ezeli Kurban (Eternal Sacred Ancient Sacrifice), Saime Tuğrul makes a 
mythological reference to this replacement: 
 In the beginning, chaos prevailes. In this psychotic core, 
everything is vague, undifferentiated and unresolved. First, Gaya, the 
mother goddess of earth, appears. Gaya gives birth to Uranos (the sky). 
Uranos is a terrifying god with a strict temperament. Although he 
constantly has children with Gaya (Titans, Titanides, Cyclopses and 
Giants), he hides them within the deepest parts of her, the realm of the 
Tartars, since he is afraid of the rivalry amongst his children. In the end, 
Gaya rises against him and persuades one of her children, Chronos (the 
time) to castrate his father and thus to replace him. Chronos cuts off his 
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father’s penis; Uranus in pain pulls himself over Gaya and forms the sky, 
and brightness takes place. From Uranos’s penis fallen into the waters 
Eros was born and from the foams Aphrodite is created. Out of the blood 
drops spread onto Gaya (the earth), Erinyes (three goddesses who are 
avengers of family and parental crimes; these goddesses are the 
protectors of social order) are developed. Uranos cursing his son heralds 
that the same thing would befall him and his reign would be ended by 
one of his children. Chronos copulates with Rhéa (his sister). However, 
fearing of the prophecy of his father, swallows all his children (Hestia, 
Demeter, Héra, Hades, Poseidon) maintaining the same tradition of 
violence. (45) 
 From the cannibalistic recipe of the Greeks to the Haitian kitchen onwards, the 
innate fear of the other presented as the devourer of all pertaining to the self does not 
seem to engage in any confrontation with the mystification Haitian cannibalistic fiction 
represents. At this point, the inherent appetite of the subject is the fusion of the other so 
as to melt and destroy it within the self. As a matter of fact, the act of fusion of the other 
is what lies on the basis of love. Phrases such as sexual intercourse or copulation refer 
to this inclusion of the other. Moreover, the act of eating itself is an exercise of pleasure 
as the primary innate instinctual disposition of humankind. In Ebedi Kutsal Ezeli 
Kurban, Saime Tuğrul refers to this somehow happy ending between the self and the 
other as “recognizing the other as a conscious subject being receptive to the violence of 
the other, namely consenting to the conflict” (19). If that’s the case, how the twin sister 
hatred would find itself a rightful place worthy of assessment when love is an act of 
violence. In his article “Dostoevsky and Parricide,” Sigmund Freud explains the ways 
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for a further understanding of the matter of eating or being eaten by the offspring 
referring to the concept of “Oedipus complex”: 
  The relation of a boy to his father is, as we say, an ‘ambivalent’ 
one. In addition to the hate which seeks to get rid of the father as a rival, 
a measure of tenderness for him is also habitually present. The two 
attitudes of mind combine to produce identification with the father; the 
boy wants to be in his father’s place because he admires him and wants 
to be like him, and also because he wants to put him out of the way. This 
whole development now comes up against a powerful obstacle. At a 
certain moment the child comes to understand that an attempt to remove 
his father as a rival would be punished by him with castration. So from 
fear of castration – that is, in the interests of preserving masculinity – he 
gives up his wish to possess his mother and get rid of his father. [...] The 
boy understands that he must also submit to castration if he wants to be 
loved by his father as a woman. Thus both impulses, hatred of the father 
and being in love with the father, undergo repression. There is a certain 
psychological distinction in the fact that the hatred of the father is given 
up on account of fear of an external danger (castration), while the being 
in love with the father is treated as an internal instinctual danger. (Freud 
8)  
 This dialogue of love and hatred in the time machine can clearly underline the 
fact that in the cases of Uranos, Oedipus, and the Haitian precursor of the zombie, the 
patriarchal order is much more essential than the order of the self. In Ebedi Kutsal Ezeli 
Kurban, Tuğrul focuses on these orders: 
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 “Patriarchal code” is even more important than the civic code. 
Fathers prevent disintegration by swallowing their sons (like in the myth 
of Uranos and Chronos). Although the father happens to be the person 
who detaches the child from the mother and introduces him to the 
society, the son is the extension of the father and the symbolic and 
sovereign expression of the continuation of the next generation. The son 
not only maintains the patriarchal code but he also sustains the father 
name. The tradition of surname sets the best example of this. Entering 
into new order requires the “murder” of the father by the son. (22) 
 The question raised herein is whether the dialogue between independent Haiti 
and the U.S. serves the purpose of a father and son, or even the murderer and victim 
pairs. It may have been claimed that in the nineteenth century the fear of an independent 
black nation led the U.S. to a fictitious fear of the other in the form of voodoo practices 
and cannibalistic intentions. Further assertations may be suggested by means of a 
challenge so as not to be devoured by these uncanny subjects from Haiti which would 
mean the cessation of the nation. In this case, neither Haiti seems to take on the surname 
offered to him by the western world nor the U.S. sounds willing to let go of the excuse 
of fear of the other as part of its colonial or even patriarchal memory. To put it in a 
nutshell, what has been served as zombie so far is a perfect fictionalized presence, void 
of a surname, nothing other than a nonentity. 
 This monstrous creature without a surname did somehow maintain its name 
though. The origin of the name “zombie” given to this fictitious presence does not seem 
to leave its African roots. There are two main sources with regards to whereabouts of 
the name “zombie” first of which refers to the writings of R.P. Van Wing concerning 
his experiences among African people in the Nzambi Mpungu region of the lower 
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Congo River area in 1921. The predecessor of the term zombie is regarded as 
“Nzambi,” an invisible being with origins in the Bantu and Bankongo tribes. In his 
article “The Zombie as Other: Mortality and the Monstrous in the Post-Nuclear Age,” 
Kevin Boon draws attention to the remarks of R.P. Van Wing and refers to the various 
origins of the name zombie: 
 Above all...the sovereign Master, unapproachable, who has placed 
man here below to take him away some day, at the hour of death. He 
watches man, searches him out everywhere and takes him away, 
inexorably, young or old…Among the laws there are nkondo mi Nzambi, 
‘God’s prohibitions’, the violation of which constitutes a sumuku Nzambi 
(a sin against Nzambi), and an ordinary sanction of this is lufwa humbi ‘a 
bad death’. The Nzambi is a religious figure, a spiritual entity with 
superhuman abilities, an object of religious faith. The term “Nzambi” 
dates to 1600 and is associated in its various linguistic incarnations with 
the idea of spirit. E. Torday claims that the term “Nzambi Mpungu” 
“appears…to mean ‘the chiefly spirit of the first man” and points out that 
the term was “revived by the advent of Christianity,” when it was used to 
describe God. This is in some opinions a misuse of the term. One writer 
argues in 1906 that the term in use North of the French Congo literally 
means “Terrible Earth” and links the term to Mother Earth, “the fountain 
of all life and, in turn, also the home of the dead.” Despite varying 
definitions, there is no question that the Nzambi was a spiritual creature. 
(51) 
 While the zombie is depicted in various portraits in a spiritual respect, it also 
embodies the mechanical puppet claiming no control of the self. The second source to 
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include further reference to the term zombie can be found in William Seabrook’s book 
The Magical Island. In “They Are Not Men…They Are Dead Bodies!: From Cannibal 
to Zombie Back Again”: Kee glances at this zombie island through another looking 
glass: 
 The term ‘zombie’ was virtually unknown outside Haiti until 
1929. At that time, though, zombies entered U.S. culture quite forcefully 
in William Seabrook’s book The Magical Island. Seabrook lived in Haiti 
and had developed a close friendship with a voodoo priestess. In The 
Magic Island, he gave detailed accounts of voodoo rituals and folklore, 
and one being in particular captured his interest. He wrote, ‘I recalled one 
creature I had been hearing about in Haiti, which sounded exclusively 
local—the zombie’. (13) 
 Furthermore, a chapter in Seabrook’s book titled “Dead Men Working in the 
Cane Fields” had been dedicated to detailed descriptions of the zombie: “The zombie, 
they say, is a soulless human corpse, still dead, but taken from the grave and endowed 
by sorcery with a mechanical semblance of life—it is a dead body which is made to 
walk and act and move as if it were alive” (Kee 13). The portrait of zombie through the 
eyes of Seabrook is therefore concerning those “plodding like brutes, like automations, 
and whose faces were expressionless and vacant with eyes like the eyes of a dead man, 
not blind, but staring, unfocused, unseeing” (Kee 14). Nevertheless, all variations of 
definitions regarding the concept of zombie including both sources mentioned above 
wouldn’t be completely reflected in what is meant by zombie for the U.S. memory in 
years to come. The cannibalistic relevance to voodoo began to lose its track by which 
time the zombie had taken place in the U.S. imagination. The idea of cannibalism which 
is linked to Haitian zombie was taken into account rather like a nation of eternal slaves. 
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 A reminiscence of the social dynamics of the time will be of vital importance 
herein; considering the fact that the U.S. being a society at the point of feeling 
dispossessed since the Civil War and emancipation survived the period of the Great 
Depression from 1929 to 1940s at which point the idea of identification with the 
concept of zombies wouldn’t be regarded as an element of surprise. They felt how 
impotent they could be in the capitalist system and in the 1930s, there couldn’t have 
been a better “ideological critique of modernity in the form of capitalist exploitation” 
(Kee 14).  What’s more, the depression not only aggravated feelings of racism but also 
rendered those of color as criminals or mentally challenged in the form of films and 
other arts. Naturally, they had become the monsters qualified for the capacity of 
becoming zombies. The concept of othering had already possessed the perfect ground 
for seeding itself. The self was nothing unless it was defined and this definition required 
the presence of the other at which point being colored made perfect sense for color 
white to take over. Indeed, much of the American society in 1930s couldn’t have been 
bothered with the discourse in which zombies maintained that whiteness was the 
accepted norm when those of color were set as monstrous and “further fitting with 
earlier colonialist discourse that generally accorded white persons an individual identity, 
zombies were faceless masses: a new means of robbing the Other of its individuality in 
order to keep it as the Other” (Kee 14). This eternal hunger of the self for its own 
survival may sound quite instinctive inasmuch as the need has somehow been planted 
within and it is as if this so called innate urge has been within the self for quite some 
time. It seems that it hasn’t been long before a representation of this motive takes place 
in the form of a performance in the U.S.: 
 One of the earliest appearances of the zombie after The Magical 
Island was Kenneth Webb’s stage play Zombie, which opened in New 
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York in February 1932. By all accounts, the story line of Zombie 
borrowed liberally from The Magic Island, and the zombies of the play 
were portrayed in a fashion similar to Seabrook’s descriptions. With its 
links to people of color, the zombie was a natural emblem for the slave, 
easily expendable and under the control of a powerful master. Yet, as 
exotic as the zombie may have been, the similarities between its plight 
and that of many of these ‘everyday’ Americans were not lost on 
observers. As J. Brooks Atkinson wrote in his review of the play in the 
New York Times, ‘If zombies are those who work without knowing why 
and who see without understanding, one begins to look around among 
one’s fellow countrymen with a new apprehension. Perhaps those native 
drums are sounding the national anthem’. (Kee 15) 
 Thus, it is obvious that zombification used in early zombie films and other forms 
of art refers to the other as a means of defining the white self. In the film White Zombie 
(1932); however, boundaries encompassing the traditional othering tends to become 
barely perceptible. Those oppositions between self and other, black and white, civilized 
person and cannibal appeared to be sharply defined under colonialism whereas in the 
case of White Zombie, these categories grew indistinct and the zombification of white 
people brought about a question as to how to define the other when the other looked just 
like the self in the first place.  
 By the early 1940s, zombie turned into a more familiar concept 
and conventions within the genre became more evident. To give an 
example, zombies were under the control of an external force that is a 
voodoo priest or a sorcerer in the early films. During the 1950s, when 
worries regarding space exploration flourished, the control of the zombie 
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was taken over by mad scientists or aliens. All in all, there had to be a 
zombie master pulling the strings regardless of the setting. In short, had 
the cannibal been used during much of the nineteenth century as a means 
of diving the world into civilized and non-civilized, the zombie 
maintained this post in the films of the 1930s, 40s, and 60s. (Kee 19) 
 The creation of the other would have never been possible unless the knowable 
world hadn’t been served within a system of categories and classes. Furthermore, it will 
not be so astounding to observe the fact that Dracula, Frankenstein’s monster and the 
zombie earned their reputation at roughly the same time and within each variation the 
American audience would underline the fact that they are what the other is not. 
However, this extended fantasy of the self both being tainted and saved by the other 
incessantly may not be easily taken for granted. Zombiism, as it was first introduced to 
U.S. audiences was comprised of neither a disease nor was it irreversible; it was a status 
just like being under hypnosis which could be experienced and then abandoned and 
most often as a result of the death of the zombie master. As for cannibalism, it wasn’t 
literal cannibalism of the earliest discourse surrounding Haitian voodoo but it grounded 
itself on the basis of the very mechanism that one used for defining the self who was 
slowly eaten away. The cannibal then somehow seemed to achieve the same ideological 
aspect of the zombie which was a new way of separating the world into its civilized and 
barbaric categories. In her article “From Cannibal to Zombie and Back Again,” Chera 
Kee sheds light onto the concept of eating the other from a social and cultural setting: 
 It is by eating the Other that one asserts power and privilege and 
this sort of cultural cannibalism concerns power relations that grant white 
peoples the ability to enjoy the privilege of being able to appropriate, 
utilize, and borrow from other cultures without having to experience 
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what it is actually like to be a member of another culture. In a sense, it is 
being able to try on other cultural forms at will with no real lasting effect. 
This is very similar to what characters were able to do in early zombie 
films. Before 1968, zombiism was a reversible state that could be 
experienced then discarded. In a sense, zombification granted one the 
ability to try on the culture of the Other without any real fear that one 
would truly become like the Other. (22) 
 All the same, what constituted the other got more complicated as the zombie 
grew up since the question raised at this point was with regards to what constituted the 
self itself. The zombie idea left the Haitian realms and tended to soil in the lands of any 
exotic group yet as time passed this link to the exotic also weakened resulting in a 
challenge to draw the line between “us” and “them” since the absence of an explicitly 
conveyed other prevented the self from defining itself. Thus, zombie turns out to be the 
embodiment of all fears of loss and those are represented as not only the parts of the 
body but most importantly the head in which the mind is hidden. Chera Kee presents a 
very appropriate point in her article “From Cannibal to Zombie and Back Again”: 
 It was rather the mind, the embodied self, that was most affected. 
One’s free will was at stake, as it could be devoured at any time, and in 
this light zombies became an allegory for the larger societal self: the 
Depression, the world wars, the Cold War, and the atomic age were all 
potent reminders that people were caught up in events essentially in 
someone else’s control. Zombies reflected a fear of the anarchy or 
monster inside us all. (23) 
 The main inquisition to be highlighted for further reading at this point is whether 
dying is sufficient enough to be transformed into a zombie. So far, the silent witness 
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may have noticed the formation of not an evolution but rather a metamorphosis of 
human in an incessant kinesis. The symbol of a cradle is not only indicative of the 
beginning of humankind but it is also referred merely as a repetition of the same end 
and that’s why the grave will attempt to leak the information of humanity hopefully 
giving away any probable secrets or it will just remain to be representative of human in 
the loop. This excavation may depict that the grave is only a gateway between two 
conditions; rather than “To be or not to be?” perhaps “To die or not to die?” is the 
question now.   
 B. Beyond the Grave 
 In addition to the sociohistorical archeology of the myth, a close observation of 
the dead man walking requires the laboratory of psycho-philosophical critiques. The 
journey of this monstrous traveler setting off in African tribal mythology, moving 
through its transformation within Caribbean religious practices and concluding with its 
current incarnation as a flesh-eating threat to the survival of the individual provides the 
metamorphosis of zombie mythology with changes in western thought during the past 
several centuries via metaphysical, epistemological and ontological lenses. The 
increased popularity of the zombie in the later twentieth century is thanks to the zombie 
mythology’s competency to stimulate existential anxieties about humankind’s own 
mortality. However, while the zombie preserves its appeal in popular culture to pose 
important questions of mind and consciousness, their role and significance in the canon 
of both Gothic and science fiction genres remains ambiguous. The recurrent figure of 
zombie tends to lure questions concerning interior mental states of sentience and 
intentionality; nevertheless, as Fred Botting questions in his essay entitled “Zombie 
Death Drive: Between Gothic and Science Fiction”:  
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 At the core of this line of semi-serious philosophical questioning 
lies an uncertainty about being able to tell the difference between the 
self-consciousness, self-possession and auto-centeredness of properly 
human intellectual processes and the merely rehearsed familiar 
behavioral habits equated with the non-conscious operations of a soulless 
machine. (36) 
 The zombie then turns out to be Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s nightmare death-in-
life from his eminently gothic poem “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798) in 
which the anatomy of zombie suggests what is uncanny about death is not the prospect 
of individual extinction, but on the contrary the hideous intimation that death will not 
snatch our individual existence away. This intimation is a pact undersigned by death 
being precisely life itself. The real terror here is not the fact that we will go away but 
rather we might be doomed to stay forever. When Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote Adonais 
(1821) an elegy on the death of John Keats, he talked about life staining the white 
radiance of eternity. It is as if death stains on everyone and no matter how meticulously 
one scrubs to wash it away; once it gets stained, it is forever smitten. Therefore, it seems 
that this combination of life and death construes both process as somehow the same 
thing and it might only be through the quill pen of a Shakespearean zombie willing to 
write a pastoral elegy for man, this human stain may appear less obscure.  
 With philosophical zombies, interiority is replaced by an agent or individual 
identity whereas the external appearance and action remain insufficient when it comes 
to perceiving consciousness. Defining a philosophical zombie as an entity that “is or 
would be a human being who exhibits perfectly natural, alert, loquacious, vivacious 
behavior but is in fact not conscious at all, but rather normal some sort of automaton is 
rather challenging in that even some of your best friends may be zombies” (37). In his 
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book Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennet emphasizes “the question of telling the 
difference becomes even more difficult when one is confronted with a complex zombie 
—called a ‘zimbo’—able to self monitor and function internally, if unconsciously, at a 
higher level and display complex behavior thanks to a control system that permits 
recursive self-representation” (310). The differences between human and automata, or 
between human and zombie will require a deeper analysis in the lights of the text; 
however, before such an attempt it might be worth paying attention to Dennett’s 
zombies and zimbos with regards to their philosophical prevalence since they are highly 
linked to a post human aspect in contemporary criticism since the question posed 
pertaining to the discrepancy between human and machine has turned into a less 
important topic of discussion than the reality of integration with the general machinism 
prevailing the world as part of a cyber culture. As human beings are already parts of a 
larger network of information and it might already be clear that humanity couldn’t resist 
the temptation of becoming automata; “we are all, so the story goes, already machines, 
already constructed higher-level functioning units of automatic, informatic, genetic -and 
indeed corporate- processes beyond our control. The human ‘we’, indeed, has become 
little more than a faded illusion in an age of technical prostheses, enhancements and 
networks” (Botting 37).  This is true in the case of humanity whose strings are pulled by 
an external technological force which is compatible with the zombie theory; however, 
the idea of cyborgs that are supposed to be fundamental to post humanism in which 
otherness is portrayed to be glamorous tends to be more predictable as wireless 
monsters can only suggest a romantic catharsis when zombies are referred to be the 
products of modern subjectivity and culture. In brief, zombies, neither living nor death, 
are presented to be premodern throwbacks created by modernity and undoubtedly they 
will pose questions around the boundaries of modern humanity.  
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 As mentioned earlier, Nzambi, the namesake of zombie, was a spiritual creature 
in the religious practices among African people. The relationship between the tribes and 
the Nzambi was religious and dependent on faith among tribal members. In his article 
“The Zombie as Other: Mortality and the Monstrous in the Post-Nuclear Age,” Kevin 
Boon underlines the fact that this belief system is not different from that of western 
religious traditions: 
 The origin of truth was external, that truth came from gods and 
demigods, and that validation of that truth was subjective. Subjective 
validation of an external truth enables one to make a claim of certainty, 
such as ‘I know God is real’, wholly in the absence of any empirical 
evidence. [...] Thus the religious traditions of western belief and African 
tribal practices posited spiritual beings and the truth they presumably 
possessed outside of self. The early modern rationalism of Leibniz, 
Spinoza, and Descartes, and the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume supplanted this religious faith with reason and began a perceptual 
shift among the general population, which ultimately led to the 
Enlightenment. Rationalism mandates that truth is uncovered within self 
(that is, within the mind where self resides), that what we know to be true 
is a matter of what our mind can reason, and that the more accurately we 
reason with respect to the physical universe, the closer our beliefs 
approximate what is true. (51) 
In the light of the afore mentioned concepts, there existed two different belief 
systems being religious faith and faith in reason according to Leibniz’s principle of 
sufficient reason which asserts that every extant must have a reason and this cause must 
be presented with a view to one of the two categories: “either a necessary God or 
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infinity” (Boon 52). The necessity of God or gods belonged to the domain of religion 
whereas the concept of infinity stemmed from the employment of reason. The period of 
western civilization before the Enlightenment was dominated by the first category in 
which God was the source of truth. The subsequent period; however, was dominated by 
reason in which the truth was realized by means of the exercise of rational thought.  
The shifting from religious faith to reasoned truth or science turned out to be 
leading truth from an external source, God, to an internal source that is reason. Yet, to 
what extent has this alteration been decisive upon the disposition that the source of faith 
lies in the other? Together with rationalism, dependence on the other as the source of 
truth did not change and many people were in pursue of  scientists and philosophers as 
the arbiters of the truth. In short, science became the other source of truth which 
ultimately became their God. 
The movement of zombie mythology also mirrors this shift from faith in God to 
faith in science. Boon summarizes this transformation: 
When tribal members settled in the Caribbean, specifically in 
Saint-Domingue i.e., Haiti, the term zombie still referred to a spirit, as 
indicated in M.L.E. Moreau de Saint-Méry’s 1789 definition of the term 
as a Creole word which means spirit, revenant. But during the nineteenth 
century, as African religious beliefs collided with western influences and 
zombie mythology underwent the vicissitudes of cultural migration, the 
term came to represent a spirit that can occupy people (still an external). 
Eventually, in Haiti, the external disappeared and the term came to refer 
to a person for whom internal consciousness and volition were absent. 
(53) 
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The empirical aspect that flourished through the end of the nineteenth century 
ironically turned out to an increased objectification of self “which to medieval 
sensibilities had been perceived as a whole, was transformed into an object of inquiry. 
Rationalism made it possible for the self to examine the self” (Boon 53). As a result of 
this self-inquiry, an understanding of a divided self played a vital role in comprehending 
the epistemological and ontological issues encompassing the extance of zombie in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The self not only could occupy both 
subjective and objective positions but it could also contain them simultaneously. The 
where does the need to negate the self stem from initially? In Being and Nothingness, 
Jean-Paul Sartre portrays this human condition: 
The lacking is of the same nature as the existing; it would suffice 
to reverse the situation in order for it to become the existing to which the 
lacking is missing, while the existing would become the lacking. This 
lacking as the complement of the existing is determined in its being by 
the synthetic totality of the lacked. Thus in the human world, the 
incomplete being which is released to intuition as lacking is constituted 
in its being by the lacked - that is, by what is not. It is the full moon 
which confers on the crescent moon its being as crescent; what-is-not 
determines what—is. It is in the being of the existing, as the correlate of 
a human transcendence, to lead outside itself to the being which it is 
not—as to its meaning. (111) 
 As for Jean-Paul Sartre, the oxymoron of this integrated separation can be 
defined by the notion of negation which can be explained by means of the labels of 
figure and ground:  
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 Negation is the ability to identify something as not being 
something else. If, for example, you are supposed to meet a friend at a 
restaurant and your friend is not there, negation is the process by which 
you identify his absence. When this occurs, the entire restaurant becomes 
the ‘ground’ to the absent ‘figure’ of your friend. If we imagine that in 
place of a restaurant we have a person, we come to understand the 
transformation that the mythological zombie came to present— a person 
who is all ground and no figure; that is, an absence of conscious self, a 
person for whom identity, self, personhood, and so on are absent from 
the body. (Boon 53) 
This status of zombie, a creature lacking consciousness which is incapable of 
examining the self and is merely emptied of being, suggested as nothing but a vessel of 
nothingness and referred to be the other is what provides the basis of the zombie 
philosophy as introduced to western culture in the early twentieth century. The 
expression of being a vessel of nothingness triggers an existential despair of a potential 
loss of self. According to Sartre, the idea of a human body absent of figure awakens the 
most primal fear: “the possibility that we could be absent from ourselves, that we could 
look into the body and find only an absence, is ontologically terrifying because it denies 
humans that which makes us human” (Boon 54). Therefore, the zombie appearing in 
literature and films during the first half of the century is basically “a physical body 
occupied by nothingness—a human shell lacking whatever properties are presumed to 
constitute self to our consciousness” (Boon 54). This definition of zombie can be 
viewed in the films White Zombie (1932), King of the Zombies (1941), I Walked with a 
Zombie (1943), and Revenge of the Zombies (1943), and read in literature in the works 
of Lafcadio Hearn’s “The Country of the Comers-Back” (1889), Thomas Burke’s “The 
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Hollow Man” (1920), Richard E. Goddard’s The Whistling Ancestors (1936) and Zola 
Neale Hurston’s Tell My Horse (1937).  
On August 6, 1945 the atomic bomb dropped by the United States on Hiroshima 
not only marked the onset of the nuclear age but also cleared the ground for the current 
zombie period. Prior to the bomb, faith still existed; it had only shifted from external 
gods to science. Yet, the bomb brought about a disillusionment of a generation and a 
deviation from modernity. The confidence in science and its arbiters which might 
convey a human utopia took a turn into being nothing but a dystopia to the 
disappointment of human race. The greatest fear of the individual turned out to be the 
loss of self since the human had no external referent on which to base his faith and the 
self was all that remained after the bomb. As a consequence of this human stain what 
would remain in the case of an absence of the self is a void of nothingness that is what 
the post-nuclear zombie signifies which has been disturbed and digged out so far. Yet, 
this individual trapped in the post nuclear world was one in which the self became an 
existential agent whose attributions were disposed by the self’s engagement with the 
world. The deficiency of the source of logos, being devoid of an external source of 
truth, which leads to the absence of a reliable other in which faith can be instituted 
leaves the individual in total dismay as a result of which the self’s greatest fear turns 
into being absorbed by the other and thus being irretrievably lost. This divided self quite 
resembles the schizoid personality that R.D. Laing describes in A Divided Self: 
The schizoid self [in objectifying others] is not erecting defenses 
against the loss of a part of his body. His whole effort is rather to 
preserve his self. This is precariously established; he is subject to the 
dread of his own dissolution into non-being, into what William Blake 
described in the last resort as ‘chaotic non-entity’. His autonomy is 
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threatened with engulfment. He has to guard himself against losing his 
subjectivity and sense of being alive. In so far as he feels empty, the full, 
substantial, living reality of others is an impingement which is always 
liable to get out of hand and become implosive, threatening to 
overwhelm and obliterate his self completely. The schizoid individual 
fears a real live dialectical relationship with real live people. He can 
relate himself only to depersonalized persons, to phantoms of his own 
phantasies (imagos), perhaps to things, perhaps to animals. (Qtd. in Boon 
56)  
What made the zombie myth gain visuality with its current echoing in the 
twenty-first century was a result of the film Night of the Living Dead by George 
Romero in 19608: 
Nearly every film made after Romero’s first sequel to Night, 
Dawn of the Dead (1978), can be linked back to Romero’s 
characterization of the zombie. And it is quite difficult to find a zombie 
novel or short story released after Romero’s third film in his zombie 
series, Day of the Dead (1985), that does not follow the director’s lead. 
(Boon 5) 
Zombie depicted as the schizoid self by Laing dominates the zombie films in this 
way moving increasingly toward hoards of dangerous undead during the 1970s. This 
paranoia was reflected in zombie fiction such as “Amando de Ossario’s Blind Dead 
Trilogy (which began in 1971), and the films of Lucio Fulci” (Boon 56). Furthermore, 
this transformation stabilized somewhat in the 1980s with the current mythology of 
zombie survival fiction.  Some of the purest manifestation of this fiction could be found 
in the novels and anthologies such as “Gary Bradner’s Carrion (1986), Joe R. 
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Landsdale’s Dead in the West (1986), Peter Haining’s Zombie: Stories of the Walking 
Dead (1985) and Candace Caponegro’s The Breeze Horror (1987)” (Boon 57).  
The post nuclear zombie, therefore, is suggested as a clear indication of the loss 
of self as a result of being devoured by the other which is set as a manifestation of the 
post-nuclear hero’s greatest ontological insecurity. As zombie travels in time, the 
othering turns into a viral disease inflicted in various forms throughout the journey and 
this gave way to the birth of peculiar categories even constituting a zombie nation. In 
his article “The Zombie as Other: Mortality and the Monstrous in the Post-Nuclear 
Age” Kevin Boon presents these nine categories respectively: 
Zombie drone is the classic zombie. Whether dead first or not, it 
is robbed of its self and becomes a witless shell used for slave labor. The 
Haitian zombie falls into this category. This is the zombie we find in 
films such as White Zombie (1932), King of the Zombies (1941) and I 
Walked with a Zombie (1943) and novels such as Peter Tremayne’s 
Zombie! (1981). The zombie drone’s appearance in literature dates back 
to the nineteenth century. The zombie ghoul is Romero’s creation, a 
fusion of the Haitian undead zombie with the flesh-eating ghoul. The 
zombie ghoul, like the zombie drone, is missing an essential self and 
operates to varying degrees as an eating machine. This is the most 
common zombie found in film and literature, present in nearly every 
zombie film or novel made after the mid-eighties. Romero’s zombies in 
Night of the Living Dead are certainly the first film versions of the 
zombie ghoul. The most notable is H.P. Lovecraft’s “Herbert West—
Reanimator,” which was published as a serial in Home Brew (1921-22). 
Lovecraft’s story contains the earliest fictional linking of the zombie to 
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cannibalism. Found both in film and literature, the tech zombie is 
someone robbed of volition by technology. Ira Levin’s 1972 novel The 
Stepford Wives contains this type of zombie. Curt Selby’s I, Zombie 
(1982) and Kurt Vonnegut’s The Sirens of Titan (1959) would also 
qualify as tech zombies. The bio zombie is one that has been deprived of 
its essential self or its volition by some external substance, either 
temporarily, as the case in Richard Layman’s novel One Rainy Night 
(1991), in which something in the black rain turns people into psychotic 
creatures until the water is washed off, or permanently, as in Wilson 
Yip’s film Bio-Zombie (1998), in which biochemicals in a soft drink 
create flesh-eating zombies. The course of zombification can vary from 
chemicals to viruses, but some substance has caused the loss of self. The 
zombies in the films 28 Days Later (2002) and Quarantine (2008) are bio 
zombies. (58) 
The mechanical, technical and bio-chemical mobilities of the zombie are 
denotative of the nomadic quality of this creature through the screens and pages of a 
fictional universe. The mechanism of othering functions in such a way that they persist 
in a circle of infinite otherization by means of both feeding and destroying one another 
regenerating further otherings. The appropriate zombie category in response to such an 
infinite otherization of the zombie theory is one which is more akin to literature and 
culture: 
Primarily found in literature, the zombie channel is a zombie that 
has been taken over by another consciousness. The zombies in Brian 
Keene’s novel The Rising (2003), for example, are cogent and organized, 
but the entities that inhabit them are not the original occupants of those 
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bodies. It is the psychological zombie that I would argue first appeared in 
film, in Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari (1920). This zombie has been 
robbed of will through some psychological means such as hypnotism. 
Cultural zombies have not yet received the attention they deserve, yet 
they offer a fascinating bridge between zombie mythology and the wider, 
general culture. Two of the best literary examples of the cultural zombie 
can be found in Brad Gouch’s novel Zombieoo (2000), in which the main 
character identifies himself as a zombie and narrates his personal journey 
from Truckstown, Pennyslvania, to Haiti, and Joyce Oates’s Zombie 
(1995). Brad Anderson’s Kafkaesque film The Machinist (2004), in 
which the emaciated mechanist is eaten away by subconscious guilt and 
becomes a wasted, corpse-like creature, is an excellent film example of 
the cultural zombie. (Boon 59) 
As for the category of zombie ghost, this is not regarded as a zombie proper; 
however this classification could be underlined since so many ghost stories are either 
included in zombie anthologies or mentioned in discussions of zombies. According to 
Boon, returning from the dead again comes to fore as the fundamental element: 
Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar” [is] a 
story in which the spirit of a man is trapped between this world and the 
next by an unscrupulous hypnotist. But the essence of Valdemar is not 
absent, thus it is a ghost story rather than a zombie story. The same can 
be said of Clive Barker’s “Sex, Death, and Starshine,” in which 
Shakespearean actors continue to perform after their death. Note the 
cogency and the presence of self in the following exchange from 
Barker’s story: Her voice was a ghost’s voice: thin, forlorn. Her skin, 
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which he had thought so flatteringly pale, was, on second view, a waken 
white. ‘You are dead?’ he said. ‘I am afraid so. Two hours ago: in my 
sleep. But I had to come, Terry; so much unfinished business. I made my 
choice. You should be flattered. You are flattered, aren’t you?’ (59)  
As a matter of fact, it will be noticed that qualifying someone as zombie requires 
more than returning from the dead. Yet, the persistent need for some sort of 
communication in this dialogue can be indicative of the quality that the boundary 
between the self and the other is already transparent enough to leak out any exchange of 
remarks and the need to be confirmed which is the ultimate necessity for being an 
entity. What is at stake at this point is the free-will of the individual and through the 
magnifying glass it is obvious that zombies constitute a greater portion of the allegory 
of the social self. 
 Lastly, the category of zombie ruse will be issued; however this notion is not 
owing to the fact of a zombie philosophy but rather on account of a marketing ploy that 
“exploits the popularity of zombie stories by invoking it in the title without presenting 
actual zombies in the plot” (Boon 60).  These are mostly books made for children in 
which the use of the word zombie tends to draw attention such as “The Gorgonzola 
Zombies in the Park (1994) and The Zombie Zone (2005), and novels, such as Bill, the 
Galactic Hero: On the Planet of Zombie Vampires (1991)” (Boon 60). Ineffective 
though these fake examples of zombie fiction might be, the attraction stimulated merely 
by the word “zombie” is the proof of its commonly known and globally accepted 
rightful reputation. Then, the next question might be whether life wouldn’t be alive 
enough, if it weren’t for the zombie? 
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 PART TWO. A SELF-AUTOPSY 
 Having visited the zombie in its historical plain and covered the varieties of 
zombies which may have been transformed accordingly, it will be important to 
understand the basis for the medium which generates animated corpses. Subsequently, 
this dual creature needs to go through a philosophical surgery. A questioning of life and 
death, and the creation of life by human as the artist will take place and the autopsy of 
the zombie firstly biologically and later on mechanically will hopefully contribute to an 
understanding of this creature in its vegetable, human, animal and lifeless but mobile 
forms.  
 A. Humanimalism  
 How was life like before the zombie pilgrimage? No sooner has any questions 
been posed in favor of a possible definition of the concept of “life” than probable 
answers may stream in a myriad of senses. Indeterminate as they might prove, the 
function of life could be challenged in the rooms of philosophy, politics, theology and 
maybe eventually medicine and biology. However, in this sort of “humanimal 
fairytale,” any attempt of a proper definition of life will eventually mount in the ebb and 
flow of a sea of information; therefore a very appropriate isolation of the term will be 
necessitated in order to articulate the anatomy of the supernatural which nests itself in 
this definition. In his book The Open, Giorgio Agamben exhumes life which he calls 
“De anima [...] from among the various senses of the term to live” (13). Life which may 
be “de anima” that is fertile enough to give birth to any organism also brings with itself 
the inciting offering of being the possessor of the living. Agamben supports his 
inclination towards the “de anima” definition of life with what Aristotle states: 
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 It is through life that what has soul in it {l’animale} differs from 
what has not {l’inanimato}. Now this term ‘to live’ has more than one 
sense, and provided any one alone of these is found in a thing we say that 
the thing is living—viz. thinking, sensation, local movement and rest, or 
movement in the sense of nutrition, decay and growth. Hence, we think 
of all species of plants also as living, for they are observed to possess in 
themselves a principle and potentially through which they grow and 
decay in opposite directions [...] This principle can be separated from the 
others, but not they from it—in mortal beings at least. The fact is obvious 
in plants; for it is the only psychic potentiality {potenza dell’anima} they 
possess. Thus, it is through this principle that life belongs to living 
things. By nutritive power [threptikon] we mean that part of the soul 
which is common also to plants. (Qtd. in Agamben 13) 
 It is significant to underline the fact that Aristotle does not give a clear definition 
of what life is, yet he limits and divides it on the basis of a nutritive function. In his 
approach, another important factor is that life is based on a symbiotic form in which one 
thing belongs to the other. Indeed, the existence of one can be dependent on the 
definition of another and thus they are correlated with one another in their hierarchy in 
which one thing needs to be separated in order to survive. Thus, it is obvious that the 
order of life depends on both reciprocal and opposing faculties in an Aristotelian 
garden. Agamben further questions where this isolated and nutritive quality of flora 
intersects with fauna: 
 The isolation of nutritive life constitutes in every sense a 
fundamental event for western science. When Bichat, many centuries 
later, in his Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort, distinguishes 
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between ‘animal life’, which is defined by its relation to an external 
world, and ‘organic life’, which is nothing other than a habitual 
succession of assimilation and excretion, it is again Aristotle’s nutritive 
life that marks out the obscure background from which the life of the 
higher animals gets separated. According to Bichat, it is as if two 
‘animals’ lived together in every higher organism: l’animal existant au-
dedans—whose life, which Bichat defines as ‘organic’, is merely the 
repetition of, so to speak, blind and unconscious functions (the 
circulation of blood, respiration, assimilation, excretion, etc.)—and 
l’animal existant au-dehors—whose life, for Bichat the only one that 
merits the name of ‘animal’, is defined through its relation to the external 
world. In man, these two animals live together, but they do not coincide; 
the internal animal’s {animale-di-dentro} organic life begins in the fetus 
before animal life does, and in aging and in the final death throes it 
survives the death of the external animal {animale-di-fuori}. (14)  
 According to Agamben’s The Open, Bichat’s two animals portray a way of life 
pertaining to biopolitics as shown by Michel Foucault in which the modern state, 
starting in the seventeenth century, began to make the population’s life as one of its 
highest priorities thus transforming its politics into biopolitics. The vegetative life came 
to fore and became a mission for the state leading to a need for the definition of the 
clinical death which “is a further identification of this bare life-detached from any brain 
activity and, so to speak, from any subject—which decides whether a certain body can 
be considered alive or must be abandoned to the extreme vicissitude of transplantation” 
(Agamben 15).   
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 Definitions for the concepts of life and death, clinically or philosophically, 
therefore set forth challenges for an understanding of a division of life into animal and 
human. A very appropriate description for what is human and what is not does not seem 
possible at this point, yet it might worth trying to initiate a humane production 
questioning where to draw the line between human and animal.  
 In an attempt to create an almost life form and play the role of god,  the popular 
modern assumption to be made in a Frankenstein laboratory as to what it takes to cast 
human into being might require three basic concepts; first of all, the materials, which 
might be referred as necessary chemicals for the makeup of the human body, the latter 
being the proper environment where these materials can be processed and lastly the 
energy, which will combine all these elements together in order to drive basic chemical 
reactions and make a living creature. In natural sciences, the source of this energy could 
simply derive from electricity or the solar power. Whereas, when it comes to the hide 
and seek for a substitute for the vital energy which is supposedly worn away in human 
body subsequently turning into a zombie is the soul itself. Without doubt, flesh without 
soul has already been acknowledged as the automata and renders a proper allegory for 
the emptied human body void of soul and mind. Nevertheless, did the first results of this 
human experiment turn out to be as they were expected? In his article “Machine and 
Organism,” Georges Canguilhem presents an Aristotelian aspect of soul for human 
mechanism:  
 According to Aristotle, the soul is the principle of all movement. 
All movement first presupposes immobility and then requires a prime 
mover or some motivating force. Desire moves the body, and desire is 
explained by the soul, just as potentiality is explained by the act. Despite 
their differing explanations of movement, for Aristotle as  for Descartes 
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later, the comparison of the body with a machine presupposes that man is 
composed of automated mechanical parts reliant on an energy source that 
produces motor effects over time and continues to do so well after the 
original (human or animal) energy has dissipated. It is this discrepancy 
between the storage of energy to be released by the mechanism and the 
moment of release that allows us to forget the relation of dependence 
between the effects of the mechanism and the actions of a body. (48) 
 Georges Canguilhem’s presentation may lead the way from an entity possessing 
both human and animal capabilities to a machine with a soul. However, it also 
introduces originality in the form of this energy for living things to exist and survive. 
Such a state of mind is the very medium where the phrase “humanimalism” could be 
coined. It is possible to oppose human to other living things for the purposes of proper 
definitions of a human being and to portray the complex relations between human and 
animal just because an animal life has once been a part of human himself. However, 
when all things considered, the caesura between the words “human” and “animal” is the 
very point which both combines and separates these two words since human’s distance 
to the animal has always been measured and considered to be quite intimate all the 
same. Girorgio Agamben observes this intimacy through his magnifying glass in his 
book The Open: 
 But, if this is true, if the caesura between the human and the 
animal passes first of all within man, then it is the very question of 
man—and of ‘humanism’—that must be posed in a new way. In our 
culture, man has always been thought of as the articulation and 
conjunction of a body and a soul, of a living thing and a logos, of a 
natural (or animal) element and a supernatural or social or divine 
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element. We must learn instead to think of man as what results from the 
incongruity of these two elements, and investigate not the metaphysical 
mystery of conjunction, but rather the practical and political mystery of 
separation. What is man, if he is always the place—and, at the same, the 
result—of ceaseless divisions and caesurae? It is more urgent to work on 
these divisions, to ask in what way—within man—has man been 
separated from non-man, and the animal from the human, than it is to 
take positions on the great issues, on so-called human rights and values. 
And perhaps even the most luminous sphere of our relations with the 
divine depends, in some way, on that darker one which separates us from 
the animal. (16) 
 It is obvious that the grave has already been “open” according to Giorgio 
Agamben. However, a very appropriate assumption to be made at this point is whether 
this intimate distance between human and animal corresponds to those six feet under 
and above. This sets forth a problem with regards to the end of history and the figure 
human and nature would assume in the posthistorical world through negation, by means 
of which the animal of the species Homo sapiens had become human. Whether the 
disappearance of human from the pages of the history constitutes a cosmic catastrophe 
or not remains to be a curious case. Nonetheless, what is of significance here is rather 
the discussion what remains in the ruins of a war-torn and perhaps a stained humanity. 
The clash of being human itself is already rendered between the states of subject and 
object of the self. Therefore, a human like animalism is an inevitable part of being 
oneself. Agamben further investigates this human anatomy citing what Kojéve dedicates 
to this clash: 
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 Man remains alive as animal in harmony with Nature or given 
Being. What disappears is Man properly so called—that is, Action 
negating the given, and Error, or, in general, the Subject opposed to the 
Object. In point of fact, the end of human Time or History—that is, the 
definitive annihilation of Man properly so called or of the free and 
historical Individual—means quite simply the cessation of Action in the 
strong  sense of the term. Practically, this means: the disappearance of 
Philosophy; for since  Man no longer changes himself essentially, there is 
no longer any reason to change the (true) principles which are at the basis 
of his knowledge of the World and of himself. But all the rest can be 
preserved indefinitely; art, love, play, etc.; in short, everything that 
makes Man happy. (6)    
 This probable lack of happiness in human could turn out to be the state of the 
“rest” which survives the death of human, who has become animal again at the end of 
the history. The matter of the remnant, with regards to the state of staying, is prone to 
come to fore shedding light onto the gravestone so much so that it is even more vibrant 
and curious than the matter of life itself. When humankind is busy suffering the trouble 
of being either alive or dead what seems to be both precarious and intriguing is whether 
human could rest on earth when the zombie may never rest in peace. Another 
interpretation to be taken into consideration at this point is an approach of Hegel’s in 
which he draws the attention to the seemingly fading figure of human as if his soul has 
been amputated: “If history is nothing but the patient dialectical work of negation, and 
man both the subject and the stakes in this negating action, then the completion of 
history necessarily entails the end of man, and the face of this wise man who, on the 
threshold of time, contemplates this end with satisfaction necessarily fades” (Agamben 
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7). Yet, it needs to be taken into account once again whether Hegel’s interpretation of 
negativity with no use which entails nothing but the end of human would complement 
with what zombie represents. Georges Bataille substitutes this idea of “negativity with 
no use” for “the open wound that is my life” (Agamben 7). Whether human possess the 
courage to open and show his wound is another matter; nevertheless, it could justifiably 
be asserted that this wound which has long been covered has been unveiled and has 
entitled itself with an unexpected word like “zombie.” The epilogue of the history book, 
then, includes the human negativity as a “remnant” in the face of death. 
 It might be a factious argument to question if human has now truly become an 
animal again. Whether human traces have already been wiped out of the face of the 
earth or it is high time the last human locked himself in the panic room whispering “the 
end is nigh” might only turn out to be meager whining. Having experienced two major 
world wars, the individual in his own bliss in the human zoo has somehow managed to 
pretend to overlook his image of the zombie. The end-products of humanity of mental 
and physical machines are, however, portrayed in an ultra historical perspective that 
“man’s remaining human presumes the survival of animals of the species Homo sapiens 
that must function as his support” (Agamben 12). Regardless of his present reflection, 
being human is not proper enough to survive. As Hegel once mentioned, “man is not a 
biologically defined species, nor is he a substance given once and for all; he is, rather, a 
field of dialectical tensions always already cut by internal caesurae that every time 
separate—at least virtually—‘anthropophorous’ animality and the humanity which takes 
bodily form in it” (Agamben 12). Then, it is requisite to think of a better name for this 
humanimal entity other than that of zombie. 
 But what becomes of the animality of man in post history?  The aspects of 
negation and death between human and animal seems to be the point where modernity 
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begins to care for his own animal life and perhaps the body of this animal, just like the 
body of a slave or prisoner, whose aporias coincide with the philosophical aporias of 
modern times is withdrawn in such an irreducible manner that it has ultimately divided 
between animality and humanity. This is a point of madness where the “stultifera navis” 
(ship of fools) sets sails. In Madness and Civilization, Michel Foucault explains the 
voyage of this madman being both the slave and the prisoner to himself: 
 The madman’s voyage is at once a rigorous division and an 
absolute Passage. In one sense, it simply develops, across a half-real, 
half-imaginary geography, [...] a position symbolized and made real at 
the same time by the madman’s privilege of being confined within the 
city gates: his exclusion must enclose him; if he cannot and must not 
have another prison than the threshold itself, he is kept at the point of 
passage. He is put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely. A highly 
symbolic position, which will doubtless remain his until our own day, if 
we are willing to admit that what was formerly a visible fortress of order 
has now become the castle of our conscience. (11)  
 Indeed, this ship is quite like the Noah’s Ark on which the mere passengers have 
always been human and animal setting sail together never having taken a step on the 
land. Considering the price this humanimal pays for its punishment, it seems there is no 
escape from this vessel. This passenger having an incomparable quality is further 
introduced by Foucault: 
 He is a prisoner in the midst of what is the freest, the openest of 
routes: bound fast at the infinite crossroads. He is the Passenger par 
excellence: that is, the prisoner of the passage. And the land he will come 
to is unknown—as is, once he disembarks, the land from which he 
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comes. He has his truth and his homeland only in that fruitless expanse 
between two countries that cannot belong to him. (11)  
 Certainly, being homesick is something long forsaken the human shell drifting 
by itself along a sea of nothingness. What strands on the shore is the corpse of a 
humanimal and its journey from an Aristotelian garden to a Foucaultian shore seems to 
end up before the circular ruins of a Borgesian resurrection shrine “in [an] unanimous 
night” (Borges 52). The integrity and quality of the body of the resurrected has also 
been a conundrum in The Open for Giorgio Agamben:  
 The problem [...] to confront first of all was that of the resurrected 
body’s identity with the body of the man in life. For the identity of these 
two bodies seemed to imply that all the matter that had belonged to the 
body of the dead person must come back to life and take its place once 
again in the blessed organism. (17) 
 Then again, with such an expectation in mind, is one able to touch life well 
enough to create a living being? Agamben provides an insight into this question through 
a biblical reference in The Open which mentions: 
 They will corrupt both in their whole and in their parts. In the 
body of the resurrected, the animal functions will remain ‘idle and 
empty’ exactly as Eden, according to medieval theology, remains empty 
of all human life after the expulsion of Adam and Eve. All flesh will not 
be saved, and in the physiology of the blessed, the divine oikonomia of 
salvation leaves an unredeemable remnant. (19)  
 Those natural operations which are arranged for the purpose of either achieving 
or preserving the primary perfection of human nature; however, can’t escape the faith of 
turning into a humanimal fairytale. ”The anthropological machine of humanism is an 
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ironic apparatus that verifies the absence of a nature proper to Homo, holding him 
suspended between [...] animal and human—and, thus, his being always less and more 
than himself” (Agamben 29). Therefore, human having been molded when all models 
were already used up has neither an archetype nor a specific rank. Furthermore, since he 
was created without a certain model, he doesn’t have a face of his own. Thus, this ironic 
machine lets him shape himself at his own discretion in either bestial or divine form. As 
human is the independent and extraordinary maker of himself, he attempts to be the 
artist of his own work in accordance with his soul’s decision. This creation process is 
more like a reverse Pinocchio syndrome in which human ends up with the punishment 
of transforming into a puppet whereas Pinocchio the puppet struggles to become a real 
boy. Another failure in the creation of this work of art is satirized by Nikolai Gogol 
when he talks about a nose which leaves the face and develops a life of his own in his 
short story “The Nose.” This nose is unlike Pinocchio’s which grows each time he tells 
a lie; nonetheless, it is also a satire for the human predicament depicting the incomplete 
and imperfect state of human. The human who is noseless and even faceless is now 
destined to take part in a zombie tale. Another literary work to set an allegory of reverse 
engineering of human anatomy is in the portrayal of Benjamin Button, the protagonist 
of the short-story entitled “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button” by F. Scott 
Fitzgerald. The creation of human is again reversed and the failure of the work of art is 
again underlined since Benjamin Button was born old, looking almost animal-like with 
wrinkles and poor limbs, and he gradually gets younger throughout his rite of passage 
ultimately dying as an infant. The paradox of birth and death are clearly presented in an 
anti-clock wise manner since it is obvious that it is too late for man to change his 
destiny and undo what has already been done. The despair and remorse of humanity and 
the irreversibility of human deeds are therefore embodied in the anatomy of Benjamin 
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Button. In his self-satirical face, the portrait of the zombie as an artist is constrained 
since the humane discovery of human turns out to be the fact that he lacks himself in the 
first place. Zombie is a work not yet done, an incomplete work of art on the canvas 
probably because the artist is either dissatisfied with the progress or startled with what 
might have been revealed through his craft. 
 This failure of creation of the human as an artist of himself in his 
anthropological machine is an ancient bequest he has long been inherited. Daedalus, as 
depicted to be the engineer and the architect of life, appears in the Latin poems, 
Metamorphoses, by Ovid. “Et ignotas animum dimittit in artes” (Ovid VIII 18) 
translates to “And he applied his spirit to obscure arts.” This “he” in the statement refers 
to Daedalus who is famous for creating the Labyrinth to house the Minotaur and 
building wax wings to escape from that Labyrinth. Unfortunately, his genius didn’t 
work out well in that he caused the death of his son, Icarus. “Museum of Fine Arts” a 
poem by W.H. Auden depicts the end of Icarus who attempts to use the wax wings 
made by his father, Daedalus. In his poem, W.H. Auden refers to the painting 
Landscape with the Fall of Icarus by Pieter Bruegel portraying not only the hubris of 
the creator of the wax wings but also the indifference of the world to a suffering in such 
a kind of lethargy which could have only been ascribed to a nation of mindless corpses: 
In Brueghel's Icarus, for instance: how everything turns away 
Quite leisurely from the disaster; the ploughman may 
Have heard the splash, the forsaken cry, 
But for him it was not an important failure; the sun shone 
As it had to on the white legs disappearing into the green. (17) 
 As for Daedalus who stands for the ultimate and ideal artist, he is the 
representative of human who fails in his art as the engineer of life. Moreover, another 
51 
 
self with a very similar surname will be found in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man by James Joyce, Stephen Dedalus appears as the main character of the book and he 
also stands for the “he” as he also can’t apply his spirit to obscure arts. Therefore, 
human’s belief that the ultimate artist is God himself is disrupted since in his own 
creation he failed in creating an entity as good as God’s. It wouldn’t be too confusing, 
then, the zombie fictionalized as the other turns out to be the ultimate representative of 
human’s failure as an artist in creating a twin for himself.  
 In terms of failure in artistic creation, another crucial point we can make is with 
regards to the voice or silence of the zombie. Moreover, we may ask what silence 
represents in zombie fiction and whether it stands for the zombie concept itself. The 
replacement of the voice that is “phoné,” turning into “logos” that is speech serves as 
the faculty which distinguishes human from the animal. Looking back upon the Ancient 
Greek where matters of life and death were based on a political understanding of speech 
which is both “phallo” and “phono” centric, one who was able to speak could produce 
language and respected with his proven existence accordingly. The faculty of speech in 
“Polis,” the public space, belonged to human who is both “zoon politikon” (man as a 
social being) and “zon ekhon logon” (man as an animal with the ability to speak). 
Therefore, the speech, the sound human makes, is requisite for being. This discrepancy 
between human and animal in fact suggests a discontinuity between the subject and the 
object state of the self. This disposition is underlined in The Open by Giorgio Agamben 
in this way: 
 What distinguishes man from animal is language, but this is not a 
natural given already inherent in the psychophysical structure of man; it 
is, rather, a historical production which, as such, can be properly assigned 
neither to man nor to animal. If this element is taken away, the difference 
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between man and animal vanishes, unless we imagine a nonspeaking 
man—Homo alalus, precisely—who would function as a bridge that 
passes from the animal to the human. But all evidence suggests that this 
is only a shadow cast by language, a presupposition of speaking man (an 
animal-man) or a humanization of the animal (a man-ape). The animal-
man and the man-animal are the two sides of a single fracture, which 
cannot be mended from either side. (36) 
 Moreover, within the boundaries of the zombie theory, the language could also 
be zombified; it could be the embodiment of the silence within the self. The need for 
language undoubtedly derives from the need for communication which turns out to be 
the discommunication with the other in the case of zombification. In the modern 
anthropological machine, the human is therefore excluded being from itself, that is, by 
animalizing the human, by isolating the nonhuman within the human. The inception of 
silence is regarded in relation with noise. Through various definitions and assumptions 
to identify the noise with, the notions of chaotic, inhumane, spontaneous, uncanny, 
uncontrollable, unwanted, vicious and wild come to the fore. Silence here can be 
interpreted through either impotence or enlightenment. With regards to its impotent 
quality, it will be worth referring to Herman Melville’s short story entitled “Bartleby, 
the Scrivener” which sets forth a character who speaks no more than a few words but 
performs the act of writing. He is the one who answers every demand with a simple 
phrase “I would prefer not to.” Giorgi Agamben states in “Bartleby, or On 
Contingency” that “Bartleby is the extreme figure of the Nothing from which all 
creation derives; and, at the same time, he constitutes the most implacable vindication 
of this Nothing as pure, absolute potentiality” (253). Here Bartleby neither prefers nor 
refuses, he is the representative of the limbo that humanity dares not to tread on. This is 
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indicative of a zone in between being and nothingness which timely fits into the zombie 
theory. In “Bartleby, or On Contingency,” Giorgi Agamben explains this when he 
mentions that “the zone of indistinction constituted by Bartleby’s reply is equally one 
between the potential to be (or to do) and the potential not to be (or do), a zone in which 
language, emancipated from both position and negation, abstains from referring to 
anything as such” (255).  Another example for the humanimal presence and its relation 
to body and language could be unearthed from “The Burrow” by Franz Kafka. In this 
short story, an animal with human qualities wi1th a faint sound has settled itself under 
the earth like a moll. What gives this creature its uncanniness is its hybridity of human 
and animal characteristics which could easily be an element of terror. The creature’s 
inner voice refers to itself as “I” and can produce ideas pertaining to the infrastructure 
of its den. This shelter, just like the grave of a corpse, is a frontier between inside and 
outside where one could hide itself but at the same time could detect any external 
intrusion. This is also a trap built by the creature’s own fears and it is a sonorous space 
which is capable of echoing both the space and the body inside. Silence in this burrow is 
therefore a portrayal for the metaphysical dimension and existential state for the concept 
of death since any sound produced out of body could only be the voice of the living 
death. What makes silent and dumb zombies uncanny is the fact that the link between 
the sound and body is disrupted. This creature’s work is always in progress, just like the 
incomplete work of art of man regarding his own self. The presence of the other is 
therefore a necessary element for the one to define itself. Mikhail Bakhtin explains this 
need in his essay entitled “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”: 
 It is a futile and surreptitious effort in order for man to look in the 
mirror to see how he is perceived by others. We can’t appear to others as 
we appear to ourselves in the mirror since the image in the mirror is the 
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image of a man who doesn’t look at the other and is in no position of 
anticipating or responding to the look of the other. This is the look of a 
person who excludes outside while trying to comprehend how he is seen 
externally. (7) 
 When making a reference to this humanimal creature it is therefore significant to 
identify a transparent border between the self and the other when providing a basis on 
the opposition between them. The presence of the zombie on the screen thus poses 
terror not only through its bodily appearance but also by means of the uncanny 
sensation its silence preserves. Zombie whose voice and language have been stolen 
from itself with its decomposed body is something which cannot be seen in the mirror 
but only reflected on the shattered pieces of the looking glass turning into echoing 
selves and bodies scattering themselves through various angles.  
 This journey from macro-universes to micro-selves has also rendered a contrast 
for the afore-mentioned argument in a 2013 film by Jonathan Levine: Warm Bodies. As 
it could be predicted from the ironically allegorical title of the film considering the 
nature of death, zombies will be represented again destitute of mind and soul with 
repulsive bodies and a lack of volition yet a difference made by the director is the fact 
that they can get warmer and in order for them to be able to ice-break, these zombies 
firstly need to regain human feelings and subsequently they need to communicate this 
by developing language. While Warm Bodies suggest a humor for human condition, the 
need to identify oneself has also been underlined as the key issue. The lead character, a 
male zombie who will fall in love with a female human, persistently strives to 
remember his name; however he ends up with remembering only the first letter “R.” 
This speck of memory might be considered rather important since zombies described so 
far are merely mindless creatures; puppets to their masters leave alone possessing any 
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process of brain activity. Nevertheless, this somehow sociable zombie never manages to 
remember his name although he develops communication with the girl he has feelings 
for and thus renamed by her randomly. Therefore, it might be indicative of the reality 
that zombies might be the embodiment of the self itself which is deficient and long 
abandoned in the human world. Instead, zombies ironically represent some sort of 
freedom in which one does not need to follow the name or the lead given to the self by 
the authority refusing everything identity suggests. Zombie, in this case, then turns into 
a pattern by which the person refuses the given name by denying language. The only 
linguistic understanding this zombie could share with the human world is through the 
acousmatic sound of the music which can suggest the fact that the world of language is 
not preferable to this zombie whereas the new world order suggested by the zombie 
manifesto is one which sustains even more humane, ideal and communicative qualities 
such as music. As for one common quality with zombie films portrayed so far is that 
brain is the part for the zombie appetite and the same case is underlined in Warm Bodies 
as well. The question to ask at this point whether zombies have the symbolic quality as 
destroyers of authority or they intend to take over in order to become another authority. 
Yet, the love affair in the film somehow seems to weaken the manifesto that the zombie 
theory might suggest at first sight; however the zombies in love, these postmodern 
Romeo and Juliet, might suggest more than a good science fictional make-up on the 
silver screen. The need to create a love scene between a zombie and a human is like a 
long expected outcome of post human anxiety and this discourse is very much like the 
relationship between man and animal. The incongruity between them is what also binds 
them together. The concept of love may actually refer to the inevitable coupling of the 
self and the other; and just like the love itself, it is an act of violence in which one needs 
to eat the other to become one, perhaps then the case of love is actually not becoming 
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one soul in two bodies, particularly in the case of zombification, one being a corpse. 
Just like the myth of “Narcissus and Echo” by Ovid,  love is indeed an act of violence 
denying the existence of the other in an echoing body: “Oh, would that I were able to 
secede from my own body, depart from what I love!” These lines by Narcissus could be 
indicative of the fact that he is neither human nor animal in his decisions but destined to 
be a humanimal trapped in his own body; nonetheless, he continues through his own 
epiphany which is an affirmation of his own slavery to himself rather than his own 
salvation: “But now I get it! I am that other one! I’ve finally seen through my own 
image! I burn with love for-me! The spark I kindle is the torch I carry: whatever can I 
do? Am I the favor-seeker or the favor sought? ” (Ovid 79). Moreover, it won’t be 
astonishing to find out that Echo, who is supposed to symbolize the other whose love 
will be cherished by Narcissus, is devoid of her voice and she is cursed by the gods that 
she would only repeat the last word anyone says. The loss of her language is also 
symbolic of the quality that her self and identity are denied by the authority and it is 
impossible for her to set up a proper communication with the other to identify herself. 
This ancient denial of the existence of the other must have been fortunately realized by 
the modern human so much so that a reinstatement seems to have been necessiated 
thanks to the presence of the concept of zombie. Perhaps, human may have chosen to 
come to terms with his own self and body whose love is nothing but one at last sight.  
 This study of human’s self-autopsy has analyzed the souls of human and animal 
subjects and has focused on the ways how brain functions and heart beats in a zombified 
body so far, and lastly the examination needs to cover the automaton’s bodily functions 
in terms of the puppet and automaton theories. In his article “The Inanimate Incarnate,” 
Roman Paska focuses on the relationship between the puppet and the master of modern 
times: 
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 For centuries, puppet theory has concentrated on the puppet’s 
symbolic relationship with human models, the puppet being primarily 
cast in the role of a surrogate human. Reflections on Puppet Theater, 
from the Rig-Veda to Marcus Aurelius to the present, have perpetuated 
an image of the puppet as a symbol of man manipulated by higher forces 
or beings, a metaphor in which the puppet is structurally interchangeable 
with its own controller, man. (411)  
 Roman Paska draws the attention further to the fact that the very nature of a 
puppet in the western culture is regarded to be something divine even being reflective of 
its self-consciousness in its integrity rather than automaton. Moreover, its object quality 
is outweighed by its usefulness as an object. The concept of negativity with use might 
be recalled since the puppet of Roman Paska moves from the “Not I” by Samuel 
Beckett to the “Cartesian I” by René Descartes; “I think therefore I am” seems to turn 
into “I move therefore I am” in Paska’s words: 
 The essential fascination of puppet theater, its ability to engage 
and hold an audience, is a function of its nature as a theatrical activity 
consisting in the animation of lifeless objects (dead things) through the 
active intervention of a living human operator. The theatrical destination 
of the puppet also determines its distinction from the automaton, the 
mannequin and the doll, with their passive claims to formal autonomy as 
objects. In the puppet theater, the use (fullness) of the object is far more 
significant than the object itself. And when the object does take human 
form, sometimes even reproducing anatomical features quite extraneous 
to its integrity as a puppet, it often does so self-consciously, as if the 
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attempt to camouflage its otherness were in fact a subterfuge for 
displaying it. (411)  
 However, what is the use of a puppet theory in terms of developing an 
understanding of the concept of zombie? Although Paska defends the distinction of the 
puppet from the automata, whether the zombie could possess the cunningness and 
spirituality of the puppet is doubtful since “the Romantic view of the puppet as a 
representational figure intent on acquiring mechanical autonomy” is what the reflection 
of the otherness in zombie attempts to prevent (Paska 412). Yet, according to Jean-
Claude Beaune, an automaton could also share the mechanical autonomy having the 
individuality and identity of his own in his article “The Classical Age of Automata: An 
Impressionistic Survey from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century”:  
 First, this automaton is a mechanistic being, and in this 
connection the Cartesian definition takes on its fullest sense: it acts by 
figure and motion, it is motion itself, the prime problem of physics, 
concentrated into exemplary machines [.] Second, the automaton is 
basically a mechanical individual. It is often possible to discern some 
temptation toward group activity, of course but not yet to such an extent 
as to affect its insularity. The combinations of instruments it presents are 
still visible, and its ‘character’ still has an identity of its own. Moreover, 
this mechanical or technological individuality relates to the broader 
concept of the individual as it develops in philosophy from the Cartesian 
cogito to the ‘responsible man’ of the Enlightenment. Third, the 
automaton has close links with living creatures in all its different 
manifestations, but especially in relation to the medicine and physiology 
of the period. It dissects the living and imitates them sufficiently well to 
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generate a gratifying illusion about its own nature; it proposes 
experimental protocols that link up with the old topics of the body, 
animals and man as machines [.] Fourth, as well as being a scientific 
individual, the automaton is also an aesthetic or more precisely, a  ludic 
object. It simultaneously demonstrates and conceals the cunning artifice 
that makes it the supreme toy, and it also shares in the mathematical 
formalization of play. When dissection is complete, outward appearance 
reigns supreme and the automaton can make play of the ambiguities of 
the inside and outside of the body. Polished and powdered, it conjures up 
an image of Don Juan or Mozart (music being one of its favorite poles of 
attraction). Whether as entertainment for the great or as an illusion for the 
masses, it plays at denying its own trickery for the pleasure and pride of 
the spectators. As they watch, they admire themselves for being 
‘philosophical’ enough to suspend willingly their disbelief in what they 
know is the object’s real nature; yet they also pretend to forget this 
suspension in order to share the great mysteries of the world with it. 
(436)     
 Clearly, having the qualities of both a puppet and an automaton, it seems rather 
difficult for the zombie not to find an audience for itself. In this human play, zombie has 
its fair share of the performance; however, perhaps not for the purposes of a 
philosophical entertainment. In his last remarks in his article, Jean-Claude Beaune lays 
a bridge between the automaton and the concept of time: 
 Finally, at this period of history, as the world is somewhere being 
mapped and cataloged, the automaton represents a kind of primal 
mythology—not in terms of the old cosmicism, which Newton had done 
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away with, but in relation to other secrets. The automaton achieves this 
through a grasp of time in which there is still some memory of the great 
era of monumental timepieces and Jacks of the clock. The automaton, as 
clock of the universe, is no longer happy making symbolic figures appear 
and strike the hour; rather, it keeps as its own mysterious secret the 
rudiments of a history of man and nature which emerges in the shadow of 
the science of space. The question of primum mobile persists in the 
problem of the origin and medium of forces. Even Newton did not solve 
this completely and the cunning automaton leaves a second way open for 
an overly pure rationality, the road that will be taken later, for example, 
by Hegel. This relationship between the automaton and time is probably 
the most important part of its originality; it is what separates the 
automaton from the machine that it, in fact, is, though it can never fully 
accept it. (436) 
 It seems that zombie as the automaton also needs its otherness in human to 
express its temporality in the encyclopedia of the time. The paradoxical logic to be 
grasped by the reader then is the fact that zombie’s trickery is merely offered as a way 
to define ourselves as human in turn, in both being and nothingness, zombies could 
possibly be our evil eye.  
 There is also an attitude to the continuum of these puppets pertaining to their 
temporality by Martin Heidegger as he refers to the machination of human nation with 
regards to being and time in his book entitled Mindfulness: 
 The predominance of machination shows itself most intensely in 
cases in which machination also takes possession of thinking and 
arranges machinationally the thinking of the beingness of beings, such 
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that being itself is made into something that makes itself, arranges and 
erects itself. Its precondition primarily is interpretation of being as 
‘objectivity’ of ‘objects’, as ‘objectness’ of objects. The ‘objectness’ is 
‘constituted’ and this ‘constitution’ in turn is relegated into a self-
constitution of the ‘subject’ as the ‘subject’ of ‘thinking’. Thus ‘being’ 
will be grasped ‘constitutively’ as ‘becoming’. But because ‘time’ is the 
form of ‘becoming’, on these machinational pathways of interpreting 
being there arises an obvious interconnection between ‘being’ and ‘time’. 
(16) 
 Last but not least, in the light of the afore-mentioned remarks, the self-autopsy 
written in this automaton biography will be incomplete without a last touch by 
Descartes as he refers to the mechanism of body. Drew Leder interprets this lifeless 
body in his article “A Tale of Two Bodies: The Cartesian Corpse and the Lived Body”: 
 While Descartes thus locates life within the body itself, this is 
made possible only by a deeper concession to death. The body’s ‘life’ is 
modeled first and foremost upon the workings of inanimate machines. 
Descartes was fascinated by the automatons of his day which, while able 
to perform a variety of functions, even to imitate the behavior of living 
creatures, were in fact driven by mechanical forces. He reconceives the 
human body as just such a machine. As Descartes concludes the Treaties 
of Man, [he mentions that] the fire which burns continually in its heart 
[...] is of no other nature than all those fires that occur in inanimate 
bodies. The living body is not fundamentally different from the lifeless; it 
is a kind of animated corpse, a functioning mechanism. (119)  
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 B. Exodus  
No longer being the sleepwalker or the organic puppet of a voodoo master, the 
modern zombie with its body being a cage and its mind holding the key, becomes a 
force of nature that moves under its own autonomy impelled by its own instinctual 
needs and perpetuates its metamorphosis into the fast moving monster of the twenty-
first century. In her article entitled “And the Dead Shall Walk,” Deborah Christie 
examines the roots of the modern zombie “tracing the development of what is now an 
iconic image of the shambling dead from its genesis in Richard Matheson’s novel I Am 
Legend” (61). Drawing on “Aldous Huxley’s paradigmatic example of societal 
evolution—of one society replacing another, often after violent upheaval, drawing on 
the Heraclitean model of progress that so influenced Hegel, Nietzsche, and others—
Christie posits [the] cyclical focus on both destruction and regeneration” (61). The 
novel’s hero, Robert Neville draws the attention of the reader initially with the solitude 
of its main character rather than a human crowd who are still alive and struggle to stay 
that way. Christie argues in her article: 
 We tend to view zombie narratives as apocalyptic because we 
believe that we are watching either the slow breakdown or the 
catastrophic destruction of human society, and we generally regard that 
as a negative event. But because we most closely identify with the 
dwindling number of living human subjects, we often miss the larger 
implications that what we are really witnessing in a zombie narrative is a 
form of violent, transformative renewal. In Matheson’s novel, Robert 
Neville may be the last human, but he is not the last of humanity—
humanity has evolved and a new society has superseded the old one. 
Further, as it was the hubris and aggression of the old society that 
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directly led to its destruction and the mutation of humans into a post-
human hybrid of vampire/human, it becomes a resonating question as to 
whether humanity deserves our sympathy. (62)  
The definition of this other society is one which is irreparable with regards to 
what Giorgio Agamben portrays in his book entitled The Coming Community: 
The world of the happy and that of the unhappy, the world of the 
good and that of the evil contain the same states of things; with respect to 
their being—thus they are perfectly identical. The just person does not 
reside in another world. The one who is saved and the one who is lost 
have the same arms and legs. The glorious body cannot but be the mortal 
body itself. What changes are not the things but their limits. It is as if 
there hovered over them something like a halo, a glory. The irreparable is 
neither an essence nor an existence, neither a substance nor a quality, 
neither a possibility nor a necessity. It is not properly a modality of 
being, but it is the being that is always already given in modality, that is 
its modalities. It is not thus, but rather it is its thus. (91) 
The it factor in the threshold which is born out of the representation of the other 
community is depicted as the failure of society and social order to protect the populace 
resulting in the failure of humanity to save itself. The final scene of Night of the Living 
Dead by George Romero, where the bodies of the first zombie appeared on-screen and 
the last human to survive are both shown being tossed into the fire by the sheriff and his 
men, is indicative of the flaw of human judgement and representative of the monster 
within. While both Matheson and Romero draw the attention of the audience to the 
body politic and the weakness of human himself, Nick Muntean’s study of “trauma 
zombies” suggest a contradictory model for a more literal walking dead. In “And the 
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Dead Shall Walk,” Deborah Christie underlines that they “represent a profoundly 
modern shift in our cultural attitudes about death, where death is no longer a transition 
but an outcome: something we become, rather than somewhere we go to” (62). This 
shift underlines the fact that dehumanization of the zombie as a product of the same 
culture which previously involved the individual as subject now grotesquely parodied 
by the zombies who wander aimlessly. It will be obvious in both films that what has 
been obliterated is the humanity itself “returning the humanlike inhabitants to what 
Slavoj Žižek has called the ‘zero level’ of humanity” (Christie 62). The existential 
anxiety exhumed at this point is with regards to that one could continue to live, but be 
nothing. The attempts of humanity to hide its zombie self have been failed with a knock 
on the door with the atom bomb and zombie is considered to be the error point of 
humanity. Considering those exposed to the radiation from the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and those prisoners of Nazi war camps, they were reduced to 
such a state of bare existence; therefore, the zombie depiction representing the feelings 
of terror called forth by these survivors could have even been innocent compared with 
what humanity offers for its own kind. Accordingly, the zombie films subsequent to 
Romero’s includes possible causes of zombification such as divine punishment, nuclear 
fallout, extraterrestrial invasion or contamination, biological warfare or pandemic 
plagues. Thus, zombie narratives “become a touchstone to decipher the deep-seated 
fears of individual humans in the contrived plurality commonly called civilization” 
(Christie 63). It could be inferred, then, humans and viruses can be equally cannibalistic 
as the zombie as they also contribute to the events of destruction and renewal. As for the 
historical and literary accounts of plague outbreaks, “Boccaccio’s The Decameron and 
Defoe’s A Journal of the Plague Year” will be signaling the fact that human is the 
ultimate virus for himself (Christie 63). When the depersonalizing forces of suburbia is 
65 
 
underlined in the films Fido by Andrew Currie and The Stepford Wives by Frank Oz, 
their connection to both the post-human and the zombie could be studied in terms of the 
inherent abjection of a homogenized suburban lifestyle. Julia Kristeva defines this state 
of abjection as being neither the subject nor the object in his book entitled Powers of 
Horror: 
When I am beset by abjection, the twisted braid of affects and 
thoughts I call by such a name does not have, properly speaking, a 
definable object. The abject is not an ob-ject facing me, which I name or 
imagine. Nor is it an ob-jest, an otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a 
systematic quest of desire. What is abject is not my correlative, which, 
providing me with someone or something else as support, would allow 
me to be more or less detached and autonomous. The abject has only one 
quality of the object—that of being opposed to I. If the object, however, 
through its opposition, settles me within the fragile texture of a desire for 
meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes me ceaselessly and infinitely 
homologous to it, what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is 
radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning 
collapses. (1) 
Indeed, the dehumanization of the person having neither the subject nor the 
object qualities through the removal of individual thought can be seen among the 
soldiers in modern warfare. Out of the apocalyptic struggles, as the wars between 
zombies and non-zombies come into conflict, new societies form and new civilizations 
solidify. “Out of strife, in the form of the human’s encounter with the zombie’s decayed 
corpse, comes, perhaps surprisingly, renewal” (Christie 65). It is high time, then, that 
the human noticed what is replaced may be the humans themselves. 
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A new society coming in and devouring the former is also indicative of the 
social and political structures enduring in the afterlife. In Matheson’s novel, Robert 
Neville is legend not because he is the last man on earth representing human society but 
because “he is the single largest threat to a new society, one that superseded humanity” 
as noted in Deborah Christie’s article entitled “A Dead New World: Richard Matheson 
and the Modern Zombie” (68). Furthermore, what matters is “whatever” that is as 
mentioned by Giorgio Agamben in his book The Coming Community: 
The coming being is whatever being. In the Scholastic 
enumeration of transcendentals (quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum 
seu perfectum—what-ever entity is one, true, good, or perfect), the term 
that, remaining though in each, conditions the meaning of all the others is 
the adjective quodlibet. The common translation of this term as 
‘whatever’ in the sense of ‘it does not matter which, indifferently’ is 
certainly correct, but in its form the Latin says exactly the opposite: 
Quodlibet ens is not ‘being, it does not matter which,’ but rather ‘being 
such that it always matters’. (1)  
Similarly, the moment of zombie and human cathexis is what characterizes the 
invasion of post-humanism into humanism. The qualities of human cannot be copied or 
reproduced thus demarcating the line between human and nonhuman. The post-human 
appears in fiction in a variety of contexts: “to designate an end to the era of social 
theory dubbed humanism, to indicate that our conceptual construction of what it means 
to be human is undergoing a profound transformation, and to account for the conflation 
of emerging technologies that show the balance of power between humans and 
machines is altering” (Christie 69). However, it is also underlined that “against the 
dangers of apocalyptic or ‘complacent’ post-humanism in a scenario based on the death 
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or replacement of humans, we should beware the grafting of the post human onto a 
liberal humanist view of the self” (Christie 69). That is to say, reading the zombie as an 
ontic object may reveal our own denial of what is inhuman in all of us. Therefore, when 
in 1954, just nine years after the Trinity test, Richard Matheson published his novel I 
Am Legend, Robert Neville, the protagonist of the novel, turned out to be the 
embodiment that human race was doomed to extinction with Neville being the sole 
surviving human doomed to battle not only with the outsiders but firstly with himself. In 
her article “And the Dead Shall Walk,” Deborah Christie continues to provide a closer 
look at this half man half animal automaton: 
Neville is our touchstone in this apocalyptic landscape; he is our 
viewpoint and, as such, determines in large part the direction and scope 
of our understanding of this dead new world. Because Matheson 
strategically alternates scenes of Neville’s brutal pursuit of the vampires 
with flashbacks of the life Neville had before the plague, readers are 
placed in a position where they identify with Neville’s despondency and 
the wretchedness of having lost the very things that gave his life 
meaning. After both his wife and his daughter fall victim to the plague 
that has produced the vampires, Neville, and by extension the reader, 
regains some measure of meaning in the methodic destruction of what we 
perceive as the enemy. (72) 
Neville loses his ability to recognize himself with its actual enemy within. In her 
book entitled Powers of Horror, Julia Kristeva makes a reference to this bereft I using 
the abject in Artaud’s text: 
An ‘I’ overcome by the corpse—such is often the abject in 
Artaud’s text. For it is death that most violently represents the strange 
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state in which a non-subject, a stray, having lost its non-objects, imagines 
nothingness through the ordeal of abjection. The death that ‘I’ am 
provokes horror, there is a choking sensation that does not separate inside 
from outside but draws one of them into the other, indefinitely. Artaud is 
the inescapable witness of that torture—of that truth. (25) 
Neville, thus, being the both the victim and the witness of his own end turns into 
the abject having lost his objects. His reluctance to move the dead body of his wife can 
be indicative of an attempt to preserve the body intact as a representation of life. While 
her death symbolizes an end where everything stood fixed, he tries to preserve her body 
as oppose to the Cartesian model of mind and body separation as if ensuring that her 
essence will also remain intact provided that the body does so. As stated in “And the 
Dead Shall Walk” by Deborah Christie, Neville’s failure in separating the mind from 
the body results in his confrontation with abjection: 
Neville’s failure to separate mind from body, memory from 
corpse, results in his having to destroy what he had hoped to preserve. 
His memories now include his having to be the architect of [his wife’s] 
final destruction—her second death. Neville’s confrontation with the 
reality of her death—and undeath—is demonstrably part of what causes 
his reversal from identification to negation. (74) 
The modern era of horror film, thus, redefines the monstrous by ascribing the 
victim quality to the hero. This is also an awakening reflective of the trauma a nation 
suffering. The bitter truth is that death is random and without purpose. No one dies for 
the greater good or to further the survival of others. The sight which displays a nation 
devouring itself is representative of the nation’s rejection of Cartesian mind and body of 
itself. As Christie proceeds in her article “And the Dead Shall Rise,” the social trauma 
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takes on its bodily form in the shape of a monster when the memory resides itself on the 
past: 
Films, like zombie films, that project a futurity of events—even 
apocalyptic events—are by necessity utilizing recaptured, revised 
restructured visions of the past—past anxiety, past trauma, past hysteria. 
They are a form of social vaccination that revisits the horror of disease or 
trauma in order to prepare the social body for some future contamination 
or event. The spectacle of horror both familiarizes and distances the 
audience from the traumatic event depicted, seeming to depict something 
new but effectively redirecting the public’s attention to past events from 
which they have become desensitized by repeated exposure. Considered 
in this light, the depersonalization that is a characteristic of the zombie—
bodies without souls—can be reconceived as a problem of identification, 
an unwillingness to recognize both similarity and difference. Robert 
Neville fails specifically to recognize the reality of  his wife’s physical 
transformation, but more universally he fails to differentiate the living 
vampires from the dead ones; he cannot overcome the differences 
manifested by the plague to identify the post-human state of the living 
vampires. (77) 
It has been made clear so far that dying itself has no purpose anymore, for those 
who die rise again as monstrous Doppelgängers of their living selves. The uncanny 
transformation of human beings into nonhuman forms is indicative of a far more 
universal blindness or apathy with the notion that there is no discernible difference 
between the living and the dead. The corpse of traditional humanism is as mobile as the 
walking corpses of the dead. These social corpses are “representative products of the 
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inherent and inseparable thing-character of human existence [with respect to] not only 
our future but our present in that they exist in a state toward which we all advance with 
the same inexorable motion known as human life” (Christie 80).  
The travel of this melancholy angel as a self-annihilating nothing seems to be 
infinite. The swan song of the zombie myth then could be cited form the epilogue of 
The Conspiracy Against the Human Race by Thomas Ligotti: 
 Look at your body–– 
 A painted puppet, a poor toy 
 Of jointed parts ready to collapse, 
 A diseased and suffering thing 
 With a head full of false imaginings. (11) 
Looking deep inside, the human will see nothing but a vast emptiness carved out 
of their humanity. His failure in preserving his own existence in fact stems from the 
failure in the otherization of the self and a hungry childhood is, thus, created from the 
grave to the cradle. It will be of significance to listen to the zombie itself in their last 
breath in what Thomas Ligotti explains to be the nightmare of being in his book The 
Conspiracy against the Human Race: 
For ages they had been without lives of their own. The whole of 
their being was open to the world and nothing divided them from the rest 
of creation. How long they had thus flourished none of them knew. Then 
something began to change. It happened over unremembered generations. 
The signs of a revision without forewarning were being writ ever more 
deeply into them. As their species moved forward, they began crossing 
boundaries whose very existence they never imagined. After nightfall, 
they looked up at a sky filled with stars and felt themselves small and 
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fragile in the vastness. Soon they began to see everything in a way they 
never had in older times. When they found one of their own lying still 
and stiff, they now stood around the body as if there were something they 
should do that they had never done before. It was then they began to take 
bodies that were still and stiff to distant places so they could not find 
their way back to them. But even after they had done this, some within 
their group did see those bodies again, often standing silent in the 
moonlight or loitering sad-faced just beyond the glow of a fire. 
Everything changed once they had lives of their own and knew they had 
lives of their own. It even became impossible for them to believe things 
had ever been any other way. They were masters of their own movements 
now, as it seemed, and never had there been anything like them. The 
epoch had passed when the whole of their being was open to the world 
and nothing divided them from the rest of the creation. Something had 
happened. They did not know what it was, but they did know it as that 
which should not be. And something needed to be done if they were to 
flourish as they once had, if the very ground beneath their feet were not 
to fall out from under them. For ages they had been without lives of their 
own. Now that they had such lives there was no turning back. (19) 
It seems that the zombie is more than willing to preserve its “remnant” quality 
on earth. In the slaughterhouse of humanity, the last crumbles of civilization have long 
been wiped out before he wakes up. Zombie is, therefore, remains to be the 
“unnamable” irony since it is what we deny to relate our otherness to while we enjoy its 
presence without the otherness of which we cannot define ourselves.   
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CONCLUSION 
 The zombie, as a literary and philosophical pattern employed in post-human 
narratives, has earned a rightful reputation in the human myth. “Zombies [...] the 
abjection of Gothic undead, occupy a curious and significantly interstitial position, 
overlooked, perhaps, but all the more interesting for that” (Botting 40). The zombie 
poetry is indicative of the fact that dualisms with regards to body and mind, human and 
zombie, self and other could only merge in nothingness. Considered to be less than 
natural and also magical and primitive, yet also more than natural in their defying the 
line between life and death, these animated corpses of negation and abjection can take 
on various bodily forms such as animal-like humans, puppets or automatons with the 
sole purpose of constituting an otherness for the self. However, in the light of this study 
and afore-mentioned points, zombie appears to be more than a gothic-science fictional 
character creating thrill and dismay on the screen for the hunger driven unconscious of 
the audience leading to their catharsis. The zombie is rather an ontological confrontation 
for the long deferred adoption of our-selves as replaced by their-selves. When humanity 
enjoys the fictional products of fantasy literature in a seemingly sentient and self-
consciously critical attitude, it appears that humans are not aware of their long-inherited 
apathy. The infinite temporality of the zombie suggests that we turn into what we eat. 
What harm could come from grabbing a bite of human flesh after all? The secret of the 
ultimate meaning of being a human is hidden in human’s own hubris and zombie being 
aware of this fact may now enjoy its long reign over humanity. If the world turns into 
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one of abjection with the negation of subject and object selves, then, what happens to 
the self itself all through this mess sounds to be a rather unfortunate question:  
 What is most uncanny about the self is that no one has yet been 
able to present the least evidence of it. Like the soul, that figure of speech 
which has long since been snickered out of existence, the self may be felt 
but never be found. It is a spectral tapeworm that takes its reality from a 
host organism and grows along with the physical matter in which it is 
encased. (Ligotti 101) 
 Humans’ despair in their endeavor to find a human stating Descartes’s “I think, 
therefore I am” amongst this wreck and nothingness, therefore, as Deborah Christie 
maintains in “A Dead New World” the human condition “seems woefully solipsistic in 
light of today’s scientific and technological advances” (71). The psychological dualism 
implicit in determining self-identification and negation, or that which is me and that 
which is not me, is where the zombie incarnates. Our discomfort with that boundary that 
exists amongst us, that objectness of our inherent material makeup whereby we 
transition from human to post-human conveys a sense of body which is no longer a 
symbolic representation of the life that was once housed there. The zombie theory in the 
making presents a reality in a way that the basic instinct of humans is not pertaining to 
the matter of life or death but is rather with regards to the appealing fear of being in the 
threshold itself. Zombies manifest the fate of the modern human figure as socially 
abjected, economically outcast, homeless, workless, wretched, materially bound 
casualties of techno-capitalist innovations. They’re us, but not quite. They render an 
automated pleasure ornamented by a dissatisfying sameness. Their repetition of the 
same always (and never) turns into a disclosure of otherness. Zombies are aimless, 
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useless, senseless, and destructive. They are the dead weight of whatever remains as 
Fred Botting maintains in “Zombie Death Drive: Between Gothic and Science Fiction”: 
 Zombies – figures of unproductive expenditure – are precisely 
those expended, rendered expendable in the process. They’re us. Hence 
the anxiety. A repulsion remains in the horror and laughter at the zombie 
– an unbearable recognition and disavowal of ourselves as too slow, 
lumbering and inflexible to cope, too corporeal and disconnected to be 
anything other than the jetsam of a virtual dematerialization [...] or, in 
horror, in recognition and repulsion of our zombie fate, with a 
counteridentificatory leap, spectators can reject and cast aside the 
zombie, becoming cyborg instead in a differentiation and re-pulsion that 
recognizes and effaces the very obsolescence of the zombie. (50)  
 Bidding farewell has never been easy, yet, “zombies look back – mirrors of the 
ragged residues of modern humanity; the anxiety and horror they embody, in contrast, 
evokes a dematerializing forward momentum – very peculiar angels of history” (Botting 
51).  
 Zombies propose recognition of a human pattern which is an inherently uncanny 
phenomenon and is something the human behavior performs as if spontaneously. In this 
vein, the inevitability of death seems like a communicable disease of the human race 
and the modern Lazarus is doomed to be in despair. Therefore, it may necessitate 
further discussion whether humanity is the tension between finite and infinite; 
nevertheless, the concept of the zombie having a recent universal recognition may be 
the interpreter of the unseen world. 
 
 
75 
 
WORKS CITED 
Agamben, Giorgio. “Bartleby, or On Contingency”. Potentialities. Eds. Werner 
 Hamacher and David E. Wellbery. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, 
 CA: Stanford UP, 1999. 243-71. 
——. The Coming Community. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of 
 Minnesota Press, 2009. 
––––. The Open. Ed. Werner Hamacher. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford, CA: 
 Stanford UP, 2004. 
Auden, W. H. “Musée des Beaux Arts”. Ten Twentieth-century Poets. Ed. Maurice 
 Wollman. London: George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd., 1959. 17-18.  
Bakhtin, Mikhail. “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”. Art and Answerability: 
 Early Philosophical Essays. Trans. Vadim Liapunov. Austin: University of 
 Texas Press, 1990. 23-52. 
Beaune, Jean-Claude. “The Classical Age of Automata: An Impressionistic Survey from 
 the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century”. Feher, Naddaff, and Tazi 430-80. 
Blanchot, Maurice. The Book to Come. Ed. Werner Hamacher. Trans. Charlotte 
 Mandell. Stanford, California: Stanford UP, 2003.  
Boon, Kevin. “And the Dead Shall Rise”. Christie and Lauro 5-8. 
––––. “The Zombie as Other: Mortality and the Monstrous in the Post-Nuclear Age”. 
 Christie and Lauro 50-60. 
Borges, Jorge Luis. “The Circular Ruins”. Fictions. Ed. Anthony Kerrigan. Trans. 
 Emecé Editores. London: A Jupiter Book, 1965. 52-58. 
Botting, Fred. “Zombie Death Drive: Between Gothic and Science Fiction”. Wasson 
 and Alder 36-54. 
76 
 
Canguilhem, Georges. “Machine and Organism”. Incorporations. Ed. Jonathan Crary 
 and Sanford Kwinter. New York: Urzone, 1992. 44-69. 
Christie, Deborah. “A Dead New World: Richard Matheson and the Modern Zombie”.  
 Christie and Lauro 67-80. 
––––. “And the Dead Shall Walk”. Christie and Lauro 61-65. 
Christie, Deborah and Sarah Juliet Lauro. Better off Dead: The Evolution of the Zombie 
 As Post-Human. Bronx, NY: Fordham UP, 2011. 
Cohn, Dorrit. Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in 
 Fiction. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1978. 
Dennett, Daniel. Consciousness Explained. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991. 
Feher, Michel, Ramona Naddaff, and Nadia Tazi. Fragments for a History of the 
 Human Body. New York: Urzone, 1989. 
Felski, Rita. Uses of Literature. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. 
Freud, Sigmund. “Dostoevsky and Parricide”. Trans. James Strachey. The Standard 
 Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV: 
 On the History of the  Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology 
 and Other Works, 1914. 1-19.   
——. “The Uncanny”. Trans. David McLintock. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. 
 1-21. 
Foucault, Michel. Madness and Civilization. Trans. Richard Howard. London: 
 Routledge, 1995. 
Heidegger, Martin. Mindfulness. Trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary. London:  
 Continuum, 2006. 
Kee, Chera. “They Are Not Men…They Are Dead Bodies!: From Cannibal to Zombie 
 Back Again”. Christie and Lauro 9-23. 
77 
 
Kristeva, Julia. Powers of Horror. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia 
 UP, 1982. 
Leder, Drew. “A Tale of Two Bodies: The Cartesian Corpse and the Lived Body”. Body 
 and Flesh. Ed. Donn Welton. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. 117-29. 
Ligotti, Thomas. The Conspiracy against the Human Race. New York: Hippocampus 
 Press, 2010. 
Luckhurst, Roger. “In the Zone: Topologies of Genre Weirdness”. Wasson and Alder 
 21-35. 
Ovid. “Narcissus and Echo”. Metamorphoses. Trans. Charles Martin. New York: 
 Norton, 75-80. 
Paska, Roman. “The Inanimate Incarnate”. Feher, Naddaff, and Tazi 410-29. 
Roberts, Adam. “Foreword”. Wasson and Alder xi-xix.  
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. London: Routledge 
 Classics, 2003. 
Todorov, Tzvetan. The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre. Trans. 
 Richard Howard. New York: Cornell UP, 1975. 
Tuğrul, Saime. Ebedi Kutsal Ezeli Kurban. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010. 
Wasson, Sara and Emily Alder, eds. Gothic Science Fiction 1980-2010. Liverpool:  
Liverpool UP, 2011.  
  
78 
 
